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PREFACE 
There are now grounds for suspecting that the 
world policy of the United States, based as it is 
upon ever-growing military forces, is reaching a 
point of diminishing returns. 
It is our thesis that this year's debate on the mili-
tary budget, as the Wall Street Journal has sug-
gested, l should reach beyond the hardware to the 
fundamental strategies for strengthening our secur-
ity, and more wisely exerting American leadership. 
In that context we offer this series of papers. 
These papers, prepared by specialists whose fields 
bear directly on the central question of our security, 
are intended to open a national discussion on 
whether: 
- our military overkill capability is beyond all 
reasonable levels; 
- substantial reductions in the military budget 
would detract from America's imposing mili-
tary power; 
- present emphasis on military spending is weak-
enIng our economy; 
- overseas military efforts are undermining our 
dollar as a unit of international exchange; 
- we could improve our security by meaningful 
foreign aid measures; 
- our foreign military assistance program is tor-
pedoing democratic aspirations and contribut-
ing little toward assuring liberty for ourselves 
and others; 
- transfer of resources from military to civilian 
sectors could be accomplished without jolting 
dislocations; 
- such a shift would enable us to alleviate the 
gnawing poverty now afflicting a segment of 
our population and to establish markets where 
government relief offices now operate; 
- ways are opening for more productive foreign 
aid; 
- the quality of our lives and those of our children 
could be vastly improved with the launching of 
a constructive American program of world 
activity. 
To meet the challenge of a constructive American 
program in support of freedom, based upon the 
still-unmatched industrial system of the United 
States, the Soviets would be compelled to take dis-
armament far more seriously than they do now. For 
otherwise, the continued strain upon their resources, 
making it impossible for them to meet a bold U. S. 
economic challenge in the world, could force the 
Soviet Union into a permanently second-class polit-
ical-economic position. 
1 "Defense Debate," January 24, 1963 
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I. HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER IS ENOUGH? 
by SEYMOUR MELMAN* 
Soon after President Kennedy presented a 1964 
military budget request totaling $56.7 billions, Sec-
retary of Defense McNamara told us, "We calculate 
that our forces today could still destroy the Soviet 
Union without any help from the deployed tactical 
air units, or carrier task forces, or Thor or Jupiter 
intermediate range ballistic missiles" 1. 
The military fact behind this judgment is an 
American military overkill capability that exceeds 
almost anyone's comprehension. The idea of "over-
kill" is a thermonuclear invention. Never before 
could one think of military power sufficient to kill a 
population more than once. 
The purpose of this paper is to indicate the rela-
tive military posture of the two major powers in 
terms of overkill. Additionally, we will mention the 
relative military manpower requirements of the west-
ern and eastern blocs. 
U.S. COULD OVERKILL SOVIET UNION 1,250 TIMES 
In 1963 about 3,400 strategic weapons-major 
aircraft and missiles-are available to the U.S. Air 
Force and Navy (see table). These major vehicles 
can deliver warheads with explosive power equiva-
lent to 22 billion tons of TNT. The bomb dropped 
on Hiroshima, which killed 100,000 people, was the 
equivalent of 20,000 tons of TNT. The stockpile of 
nuclear warheads is probably twice the number de-
liverable by the major aircraft and missiles now on 
hand. 
To determine the possible military significance of 
this much nuclear power, let us enter upon some 
calculations that are at once nightmarish and real-
istic. In this study we will designate the relation-
ship-100,000 persons killed by 20,000 tons of 
TNT-a "Hiroshima equivalent". 
On the entire surface of the earth there are now 
about 2,000 cities of over 100,000 population. These 
cities have a total population of about 600 million.2 
If everyone of these cities was a target for nuclear 
destruction, given an allowance of 30 per cent fail-
ure to deliver to target, the United States strategic 
vehicles alone could deliver the equivalent of 2112 
million tons of TNT for each 100,000 inhabitants-
or 125 "Hiroshima equivalents". This fact means, in 
effect, that the United States at this time possesses, 
on a global scale, an overkill capability of 125 times. 
In the Sino-Soviet bloc, the population of ap-
proximately 370 cities equals approxitnately 1,400 
"Hiroshima equivalents". Again, allowing for 30 per 
cent attrition of delivery weapons, U. S. overkill cap-
ability for the entire Sino-Soviet area is 500 times. 
Finally, the Soviet Union alone contains roughly 
140 cities of 100,000 population or over-alto-
gether, approximately 500 "Hiroshima equivalents". 
Allowing 50% failure to deliver warheads, the U. S. 
alone could deliver about 25 million tons per "Hiro-
shima equivalent", amounting to a U.S. overkill 
capability of 1,250 times. 
In these calculations, we have excluded any con-
tribution that might be made by fighter planes, inter-
mediate and short-range missiles, torpedoes, mines, 
cannon, and tactical rocket launchers like the "Davy 
Crockett". 
MORE CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS ALSO SHOW 
OVERKILL ABILITY 
It is possible to estimate U.S. overkill capability 
on the basis of other assumptions. For instance, if 
one assumes that one megaton (one million tons of 
TNT equivalent) is the average yield of an ICBM 
warhead, and that a one-megaton bomb is the size 
most likely to be delivered to most cities of 100,000 
or more population, then the following results would 
obtain: 
- For the 2,000 major cities of the world, the 
U. S. has an overkill capacity of 7.6 times, al-
lowing for a 30% attrition of delivery systems. 
- For the 370 major cities of the Sino-Soviet 
bloc, the U.S. has an overkill capacity of 41 
times, allowing for a 30% attrition of delivery 
systems. 
- For the 140 major cities of the Soviet Union, 
the U.S. overkill capacity is 78 times, even al-
lowing for a 5070 attrition of carriers. 
Within any technically plausible framework of 
reasoning, the conclusion is that the U. S. possesses 
* Professor of Industrial and Management Engineering, Colum-
bia University; The Peace Race, George Braziller, Ballantine 
Books, N. Y., N. Y., 1961; Dynamic Factors in Industrial 
Productivity, John Wiley, N. Y., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1956; 
(ed.) Inspection for Disarmament, Columbia University Press, 
N. Y., N. Y., 1958. 
1 UPI dispatch January 31, 1963. 
2 H. Hoyt, World Urbanization, Urban Land Institute, Washing-
ton, D. C., technical bulletin 43, April 1962. 
1 
overwhelming nuclear destructive capability. If the 
size of these forces seems unreasonable, that is all 
the more striking when it is understood that they 
were designed by men whose avowed purpose was 
to erect a retaliatory force of such power as to make 
a "nuclear Pearl Harbor" on the United States look 
like a patently unworkable proposition, and thereby 
preserve the peace. It seems that the institutional 
machine, once set in motion for these purposes, de-
veloped a momentum of its own to generate the 
present condition of overkill. 
USSR COULD OVERKILL U. S. 145 TIMES 
The destructive capability of Soviet forces is esti-
mated by the same reasoning applied to U. S. forces, 
with some modifications (see table). On the same 
basis as our first set of calculations, the Soviet Union 
would have the following capabilities: 
- For the 2,000 cities in the world of 100,000 or 
more population, no overkill capacity if a 30% 
attrition rate is applied to delivery systems. 
This is so because with about 2500 delivery 
vehicles, 30% losses would leave less than one 
vehicle per target. However, if one figures, 
arbitrarily, an attrition rate of 20%, then USSR 
delivery capability would be 3.2 megatons per 
100,000 persons in the major cities-or an 
overkill of 160 times. 
- For the 404 NATO area cities of 100,000 peo-
ple or more, the Soviets could deliver about 9 
megatons per 100,000 city people, allowing for 
a 30% attrition of delivery systems. This is an 
overkill capability of 450 times. 
- For the 192 U. S. cities of 100,000 or larger, 
USSR medium-range vehicles are excluded and 
an attrition of 50 0/0 is assumed. Yet the Soviets 
could deliver about 2.9 megatons per 100,000 
city people-an overkill factor of 145 times. 
WEST SURPASSES EAST IN MILITARY MANPOWER 
NATO forces in 1963 total 5.9 million persons, 
of which the U. S. accounts for 2.8 million. Total 
Western alliances forces are 6.6 million in 1963. 
When forces of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are 
added to these, the armed forces of the U. S. treaty 
powers come to a grand total of 8.0 million. 
Total Communist-bloc forces are 7.7 million for 
1963. Of these, USSR accounts for 3.6 million; 
USSR plus Warsaw Pact nations, 4.6 million; China 
2.4 million. North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba 
account for 0.7 million. 
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The U.S. has 5.68% of its male labor force in the 
armed services. The USSR figure is estireated at 
5.5 0/£ 3. 
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS 
Operational in 1963 
United States Yield per Number of Total Yield Vehicle Delivery 
Weapon System (megatons) (megatons) Vehicles 
B 47 bombers 6,000 10 600 
B 52 bombers 12,000 20 600 
B 58 bombers 2,000 20 100 
Atlas missiles 120 (1) est. 120 
Titan 1 missiles 50 (I) " 50 
Titan 2 missiles 30 ( 1) " 30 
Minuteman missiles 500 (1) " 500 
Skyhawk A-4D Navy aircraft 1,000 (1) " 1,000 
Skywarrior A-3D Navy aircraft 150 (I) " 150 
Polaris submarines (15 with 
16 missiles each) 120 0.5 240 
Totals 21,970 3,390 
Note: Table does not include smaller planes, intermediate and 
short-range missiles, torpedoes, mines, cannon, tactical 
rocket launchers ("Davy Crockett"). 
Source: Congressional Record, Jan. 16, 1963, pp. 393-416, report 
of study by Institute of Strategic Studies, London. 
Soviet Union (estimated) Yield per Number of Total Yield Vehicle Delivery 
Weapon System (megatons) (megatons) Vehicles 
Intercontinental missiles 1,875 25 75 
Long-range bombers 4,000 20 200 
Su bmarines (10-12 est. 
carrying 10 missiles each) 100-200 1 100-200 
Medium-range missiles 3,500 5 700 
Medium-range bombers 14,000 10 1,400 
Su per-in tercon tinen tal 
missiles 500 50 10 (est.) 
Totals 23,975-24,075 2,485-2,585 
This adds up to approximately 2,500 delivery vehicles carrying 
24.0 billion tons of TNT equivalent, and breaks down to: 
Long range: 485 delivery vehicles carrying 6.5 billion tons 
TNT equivalent. 
Medium range: 2,100 delivery vehicles carrying 17.5 billion 
tons TNT equivalent. 
Note: Medium range missiles and bombers are included in esti-
mate of Soviet strategic weapons (though not in the U. S. 
estimate) because the shorter-range Soviet weapons could 
be directed to European cities and other areas adjacent to 
USSR. 
Source: Congressional Record, Jan. 16, 1963, pp. 410-412. 
New York Times, January 19, 1961. 
3 Congressional Record, January 16, 1963, p. 398. 
2. THE MILITARY BUDGET- IS THERE A CHOICE? 
by SEYMOUR MELMAN 
The massive overkill capability of present u. S. 
military forces makes a careful review of the pro-
posed fiscal 1964 military budget a matter of urgent 
public concern. 
In order to facilitate discussion of the military 
budget in Congress and among the American pub-
lic, three possible national defense budgets for fiscal 
1964 are outlined in this paper (see table) . 
ADMINISTRATION BUDGET REQUESTS 
$56.7 BILLIONS 
The administration budget for fiscal 1964 re-
quests authorization for spending $56.7 billions. 
The implication is that the available overkill capabil-
ity is insufficient and needs to be enlarged. J ustifica-
tion for this expansion has not been clearly set forth. 
On the contrary, Secretary of Defense McNamara 
has made it clear that the U. S. already possesses the 
capacity to destroy the Soviet Union without requir-
ing the use of smaller aircraft or smaller missiles.! 
Until recently, the "counterforce" concept of 
national security has appeared to have the full en-
dorsement of the Secretary of Defense. This policy 
scheme includes the perspective of developing nu-
clear military capability of sufficient size to over-
whelm Soviet forces, if necessary, in one blow, with-
out sustaining intolerable losses to one's own side 
from a counterblow. 
The "counterforce" perspective has been rendered 
implausible by the development on the Soviet side 
of the same sort of "hard" missile locations and sub-
marine carriers for missile launching as developed 
by the U. S. Under these circumstances, the "coun-
terforce" perspective reflected in the Administration 
budget has no military reality - all apart from the 
political or human considerations that surround 
such schemes. 
Accordingly, this paper suggests a second mili-
tary budget reflecting the concept of maintenance-
of -present-forces. 
MAINTENANCE-OF-PRESENT-FoRCES BUDGET 
SET AT $34 BILLIONS 
The maintenance-of-present-forces budget is based 
.on the assumption that existing military forces in-
clude enormous destructive capability and that 
major additions to these forces serve no plausible 
function. On these grounds, the Administration 
budget has been reviewed with the aim of formulat-
ing a budget plan which makes possible full main-
tenance and operational performance of the forces 
now in being, but does not provide significant addi-
tions to the present overkill capacity. On this basis, 
the military personnel items in the budget are left 
intact, as are the operations and maintenance re-
quests. However, the procurement item is marked 
for a sharp cut-from $16.7 billions down to $6.7 
billions. 
Similar reasoning underlies the cut in the re-
search, development, and testing budget-reducing 
that item from $7.2 billions to $200 millions. The 
justification for major military research and develop-
ment has been that this effort is required to attain 
and hold military superiority over the Soviets. The 
technologies of nuclear weapons, alone, have now 
developed to the point where a great variety of 
alternative methods are available for delivery of 
nuclear warheads. These include missiles of all sizes, 
bombs carried by planes, underwater mines, can-
nons, short-range rockets, and even "bazookas." 
Warheads of the very largest size may be delivered 
swiftly by intercontinental missiles or may be set off 
from a great distance with the warhead lying below 
the surface of the sea in the form of an underwater 
mine. Offensive capabilities have become so varied 
and deadly that there is no basis for assuming the 
feasibility of constructing reliable defensive systems 
against all possible warhead delivery methoas. De-
fensive methods of every conceivable sort can be 
saturated and overwhelmed by the variety and quan-
tity of offensive weapons. 
On the offensive side, destructive capability, hav-
ing already gone far beyond the overkill mark, calls 
for no further improvement on military grounds. 
Addition to overkill is no gain. The multiplication 
of overkill capability, although without military 
meaning, can be understood as one aspect of a 
technological race that is run for its own sake in the 
spirit of an international sporting event. 
We do not argue that the basic scientific research, 
now financed by the military agencies, should be 
discontinued. Rather, this sort of work should be 
1 UPI dispatch, January 31,1963. 
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assigned where it belongs-under the National Sci-
ence Foundation. 
While maintenance-of-present-forces may require 
an extension of family housing for military person-
nel, it does not require further military construction. 
The civil defense item is excluded here on the 
grounds that the civil defense concept is technically 
faulty and is politically dangerous. (See data and 
analysis in S. Melman, No Place to Hide, Grove 
Press, N. Y., 1962.) Civil defense is a "useful" in-
strument mainly in relation to "counterforce" 
schemes-a major civil defense program announces 
an intention to strike first. 
The military assistance item is eliminated for rea-
sons given in Part 6 of this series of papers. Further 
enlargement to the already massive military assist-
ance expenditures abroad serves no constructive pur-
pose for the U. S. 
The atomic energy item would be reduced by two-
thirds under this alternative budget. It is assumed 
that about two-thirds of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission budget is used for operating the large manu-
facturing plants at Oak Ridge, Paducah, Hanford, 
and elsewhere. As the warhead stockpile of the U. S. 
is a multiple of the warheads that can be carried by 
all present delivery vehicles, it makes no sense at all 
to continue operating these plants and filling ware-
houses and caves with further nuclear warheads. 
The Selective Service System is allowed its full 
budget request and is part of the maintenance-of-
present-forces concept. The stockpiling of strategic 
materials is eliminated as are the various additions 
to em'ergency preparedness programs. 
Altogether, the estimate for maintenance-of-pres-
ent-forces budget amounts to $34 billions, a reduc-
tion of $22 billions from the Administration budget. 
FINITE-DETERRENT BUDGET SET AT $9.2 BILLIONS 
The description of the finite-deterrent concept 
and an indication of its efficacy were put most suc-
cinctly by Jerome B. Wiesner~ now scientific adviser 
to President Kennedy. Wiesner wrote in 1960: 
... "Studies made independently by the U.S. Army 
and Navy have indicated that, even in the absence 
of [international] agreements limiting force size 
and permitting inspection, 200 relatively secure 
missiles would provide an adequate deterrent."1 
The finite-deterrent concept includes the mainte-
1 Jerome B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Sys-
tems," in D. Brennan (ed.) Arms Control, Disarmament and 
National Security, George Braziller, N. Y. , 1961 , p. 220. 
THREE POSSIBLE NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGETS 
FOR FISCAL 1964 
Major Military Functions 
Military personnel 
Present programs ........ .... .... ........... .. . 
Pay increase .. ....... ... ...... .......... .... .. .. . . 
Operation and maintenance ...... ......... .. . 
Procurement ...... ........ ....... ..... .............. . . 
Research, development, tests ....... .......... . 
Mili tary construction ... ....... ..... ..... .... ... . 
Family housing ......... ... .... ............... ... ... . 
Civil defense ..... ... ..... ... ... ........ .............. . 
Military assistance ......... ............. .... .. ..... . 
Atomic energy .......... .................... .. ... .. . 
Defense Related Activities 
Strategic materials stockpile ............. . 
Selective Service ... ............................ . 
Emergency preparedness ..... .. ...... .... .. . 
Present programs ....................... .. . 
Proposed ................................ ... .... . 
Totals .. ... ................ ..... ...... .... ... . 
Administration 
Budget 
$13,235 
900 
11,792 
16,725 
7,262 
1,232 
734 
300 
1,480 
2,893 
28 
38 
52 
30 
$56,702 
Maintenance-of -
Present-Forces 
Budget 
(In millions of dollars) 
$13,235 
900 
11,792 
6,725 
262 
734 
893 
38 
$34,580 
Finite-
Deterrent 
Budget 
$3,500 
4,200 
1,000 
500 
$9,200 
Source: Proposed Administration budget from The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1964, U. S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1963, p. 61. 
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nance of a limited but powerful system of delivery 
vehicles and warheads so emplaced as to be reason-
ably secure against attack. These would threaten an 
aggressor with destruction of his country as a pre-
dictable punishment for an act of aggression against 
the U.S. 
The 940 strategic missiles in place in 1963 (land-
based and submarine) are far in excess of the 200 
units postulated by Dr. Wiesner. 
This finite-deterrent budget includes funds for 
the operation and maintenance of all these delivery 
vehicles as well as substantial aircraft and land 
forces and would add up to overkill capability if 
applied to the Soviet Union. 
This finite-deterrent budget is $9.2 billions-and 
would represent a reduction of $47.5 billions from 
the military budget proposed by the President for 
the 1964 fiscal year. 
3. MILITARY EMPHASIS BLAMED FOR STATE OF ECONOMY 
by SEYMOUR MELMAN 
The basic industries of the United States are be-
coming non-competitive not only in the world mar-
ket, but even within the United States. The concen-
tration of U. S. capital investment and technological 
talent on military activity is at the root of this de-
cline. 
The American shipbuilding industry produces fine 
products, but at so high a cost and price as to be un-
o competitive in the world shipbuilding market. Indus-
trial plants in America's Midwest have recently been 
drawing their iron and steel requirements-not from 
nearby American industry but from Belgian and 
French sources of supply. Until the recent round of 
severe price cutting began, the heavy electrical 
machinery manufacturers were having increasing 
difficulty in meeting European competition in the 
world markets and at home as well. 
U. S. MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY LOSES RANK 
The pages of American journals that specialize 
in machine tools disclose increasing advertising of 
foreign-built machines. The American machine tool 
industry, once a leading world producer, is now in 
fourth or fifth place in the volume of its output. The 
typewriter industry in the U. S. as recently as 1948 
supplied virtually all U. S. requirements. It now only 
supplies 60% of the typewriters that are sold here 
each year. The remainder are imported, mainly from 
European factories. 
The machinery-producing industries of the U. S., 
whose products amount to about 15 J1o to 20% (by 
value) of all our manufacturing, are in a deteriorat-
ing condition. There are notable exceptions such as 
the earth-moving machinery industry. 
The common feature of this industrial decline is 
the failure of the managements involved to produce 
the capital for research and new equipment that 
would raise the productivity of labor and thereby 
offset the higher wages of American labor. Such in-
vestment is required if U. S. industry is to produce 
the products that can be competitive on the world 
and domestic mark~ts. 
High hourly earnings of labor can be combined 
with mechanization and industrial engineering to 
produce goods at low unit cost and price. That is a 
basic lesson of America's industrial experience. But 
the competence of modern technology has been 
withheld from a major section of our civilian econ-
omy. 
The process of deterioration at the base of Amer-
ica's manufacturing is seen in the statistics on the 
age of manufacturing equipment. In 1962, the Mc-
Graw-Hill Publishing Co. reported that its survey of 
overseas operations by American industrial com-
panies indicated that less than 25 % of the U. S. 
firms' foreign plants and equipment were purchased 
before 1950, while 60% of the productive facilities 
within the U. S. were bought before 19501• 
The failure of U. S. firms to replace aged equip-
ment is shown in the critical machine tool industry. 
There are about 2.2 million machine tools in the 
U. S. If these were being replaced at the average rate 
of once every ten years, then there would be an 
average annual requirement of about 220,000 ma-
chines for replacement alone. During recent years, 
the actual output of America's machine tool indus-
try has been in the range of 40,000 to 50,000 
machines per year. 
Moreover, a considerable proportion of the ma-
chines of new design, such as the sophisticated 
numerical control equipment, have been on order 
for manufacturers of military products. This means 
that ' the civilian sector of American industry has 
1 American Machinist Magazine, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co .• 
Nov. 26. 1962. 
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been depleting its machinery efficiency even more 
than is revealed by the statistics. The manufacture 
of military goods, however intricate, results in no 
further production. These goods are end products, 
having no further productive use. 
MILITARY ApPLICATION OF MACHINERY 
IS ONE REASON FOR LAG 
This characteristic of military products-that they 
are an end product-is at the root of the recent dif-
ferences in industrial growth rate between the U.S. 
and the countries of the Common Market. From 
1953 to 1960, the Common Market countries in-
creased their industrial production by 71 % and the 
U.S. increase was 19-%. From 1950 to 1960, the 
countries of the Common Market increased their 
output of all goods and services by 103 %. The 
U. S. increase for this same period was 76 per cent. 
These differences in total activity were amplified 
in the industrial markets of the world. Thus, from 
1954 to 1961, manufacturers' exports from the 
Common Market countries rose by 128%. U.S. 
manufacturing exports rose by only 51 %1. 
MILITARY SPENDING, CAPITAL INVESTMENT-
U.S. AND COMMON MARKET (1960) 
United States Common Market 
Military expenditures as % 
of GNP 9.2% 4.2% 
Machinery and Equipment 
as % of GNP 5.4% 10.2% 
Source: Statistical Abstract 0/ the U. S., 1962. 
These differences in industrial growth between 
countries of the European Common Market and the 
United States have their roots in the contrasting 
emphasis on activity in military and civilian produc-
tion. The table above shows military expenditures 
and investment in machinery and equipment- each 
in the percent of the gross national product (GNP) 
for each territory. The display of the table is that of 
an inversion between the U.S. and the Common 
Market countries with respect to military expendi-
tures and investment in new machinery and equip-
ment. The greater emphasis on new means of pro-
duction in the Common Market countries generates 
the higher rate of growth and the increased com-
petitiveness of the manufacturing industry in that 
area. 
MILITARY WORK CUTS DEEPLY INTO SOME 
GOODS AND SERVICES 
The 10% of U.S. gross national product used for 
military purposes is not an average 10% of goods 
6 
and services. The 10% contains well over half the 
nation's scientists and engineers whose services are 
used for military purposes. 
Senator Hubert Humphrey reported to the U. S. 
Senate, Small Business Committee (Aug. 29, 1962) 
that in the United States the federal government 
pays for about 65 per cent of all research and de-
velopment, mostly military, and that: 
In Germany, 85 per cent-85 cents out of 
every research dollar - is private, and less than 
15 per cent goes into military and space. Eighty-
five cents of that goes into the civilian economy, 
so'that today the German plant competition for 
world markets of civilian goods is being auto-
mated, modernized, equipped in the latest and 
best fashion, and new products are developing, 
while we are developing new wrappings. Weare 
the greatest packagers in the world ... In Japan, 
it is about 85 to 15 again .. .in England, which 
also has a low rate of economic growth, as does 
our country, 60 cents out of every research dol-
lar is governmental and goes into military and 
space, atomic energy ... 
What is happening to our civilian economy 
as we plow more and more of our scientific per-
sonnel, our brains, into the military and into 
space and into atomic energy for military pur-
poses? Where are we going to end up in this 
trade competition with these Belgians and these 
Dutch, who are clever, and the Germans, who 
are very clever, who are spending more money 
for civilian aspects and will develop products 
cheaper, better, and more serviceable?2 
Progressive decline of U.S. civilian manufactur-
ing industry, owing to these causes, will result in 
progressive deterioration of competitive position in 
the domestic market as well. An important assess-
ment of our civilian deficit was recently given in a 
report of the Engineering Research Committee of 
the Engineers Joint Council. 3 
Correction of these tendencies requires a shift in 
the use of money and technical manpower from 
military activities to the civilian economy. A first 
step in accomplishing this shift would be the blue-
printing of the conversion from a . ~ilitary to a 
civilian economy; by firms, communItIes, and gov-
ernments. 
1 U.K. Board of Trade Journal, Nov. 23, 1962; Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States, 1961 and 1962. 
2 Cited in The Nation, Feb. 16, 1963, p. 133. 
3 The Nation's Engineering Research Needs, 1965-1985, 1962 
(EJC, 345 East 47th St., New York 17, N. Y.). 
4. AMERICAN DOLLAR IN JEOPARDY 
CAN FLIGHT OF GOLD BE HALTED? 
by TERENCE MCCARTHY* 
The claim is made that the enormous annual ex-
penditure on armaments and the military establish-
ment in this country is vitally essential to the main-
tenance of America's world position. It is nearer the 
truth to say that without a shot being fired, without 
United States armies once engaging the enemy, her 
world position is being frittered away, irretrievably, 
by America's tacit repudiation of the basic value of 
her currency. 
I t is true that gold is still exchanged for dollars 
and dollars for gold at $35 per ounce. But the abil-
ity to continue doing so grows less and less as the 
months pass. The accumulation of foreign short-
term claims upon U. S. gold reserves, despite the 
willingness of foreign central banks to help alleviate 
temporary difficulties, will undermine the employ-
ment of the dollar as the banking currency of the 
world. This is precisely how sterling was under-
mined as a world currency in 1931. 
However she may try to escape this trap of her 
own making America cannot remedy the situation 
until government expenditures are brought within 
reasonable bounds. And this cannot be done so long 
as almost 10% of the gross national product is allo-
cated in military expenditures financed by debt. 
The purpose of this paper is briefly to review the 
embarrassing erosion of U. S. gold reserves and to 
suggest reasonable and prudent action to curb this 
erosion. 
U.S. GOLD STOCKS LOWEST SINCE 1939 
From the end of 1949 to February, 1963, the 
monetary gold stock of the U. S. Treasury shrank by 
$8.7 billions-from $24.6 billions down to $15.9 
billions. The February balance was the lowest figure 
for the nation's gold reserves since May 10, 1939. 
The loss in gold was $100 million in the first two 
months of 1963 alone. This drain occurred despite 
reciprocal currency arrangements with leading for-
eign banks and the Bank for International Settle-
ments, designed to counter speculative attacks on 
the dollar and to avoid hemorrhage of gold reserves 
when foreign central banks accumulate dollars in 
excess of amounts they deem prudent. 
This drainage of U. S. gold stock is not some 
short-term phenomenon caused by malproportions 
which will correct themselves in the natural course 
of events. It is a persistent problem, arising from 
sales of gold to foreign governments and central 
banks in settlement of continuing U.S. deficits in 
the balance of international payments. In 1962 the 
overall deficit on international account totalled $2.2 
billions~ and the drain on U.S. gold was $912 mil-
lions. In 1961 the deficit was $2.5 billions and the 
loss of gold was $877 millions. In the three years 
1958-1960, the U.S. experienced deficits in its bal-
anc.e of payments averaging $3.7 billions per year. 
The total adverse balance in the five years ending in 
1962 approximated $15.8 billions. 
DEFICITS PERSIST DESPITE FAVORABLE 
TRADE BALANCE 
The most significant aspect of the balance of pay-
ments deficits is that they have occurred in the face 
of a very large excess of merchandise exports over 
merchandise imports. During 1955-1961, U. S. ex-
ports of merchandise to all the world totalled $122.9 
billions and the merchandise imports totalled $95.1 
billions - giving a net balance in America's favor of 
$27.8 billions. Yet the loss of gold in these seven 
years amounted to $4.8 billions. The stock of mone-
tary gold shrank 22%, even though U.S. commercial 
sales of merchandise abroad far exceeded purchases 
from other countries. 
For years past it has been a feature of U. S. 
national policy that a favorable balance of trade on 
merchandise account has financed government ex-
penditures overseas. During 1955-1961, net exports 
by the U.S. Government totalled $28.1 billions, con-
sisting of $14.8 billions in military supplies and 
services abroad, and $13.3 billions in other ex-
ports, including all kinds of non-military services 
abroad, grants, credits, aid and assistance programs. 
Government net exports during those six years were 
almost exactly equivalent to the favorable net bal-
ance of trade on merchandise account-$28.1 bil-
lions in government exports, $27.8 billions in mer-
chandise trade. 
* Dip. Econ. Pol. Sci. (Oxon); consulting economist; vice-presi-
dent, Basic Economic Appraisals, Inc. 
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To put the matter another way, 53% of the gain 
in international merchandise transactions had been 
spent or dissipated in all sorts of military ventures 
overseas. The balance has been used up in equally 
costly although, in some instances, both unavoidable 
and constructive, expenditures by the U. S. Govern-
ment in all areas of the Free World. 
If there were no greatly complicating factors be-
y~nd this equation of net merchant gain and govern-
ment spending abroad, there might be no real cause 
for concern. One could question whether U.S. re-
sources in all cases were being employed in ways 
beneficial or detrimental to the national and the 
world's best interests. But there would be no need 
to fear erosion of the foundations of the economy by 
constant pressures against the-dollar. 
U.S. ROLE IN WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM 
Is JEOPARDIZED 
However, the matter is much more complicated. 
The role which the United States has assumed in 
world affairs, specifically its role in the world's 
monetary system, does not permit this fair equality 
between a favorable merchandise trade balance and 
overseas expenditures to harmonize international 
payments and international receipts. U. S. inter-
national deficits persist, and the national currency is 
increasingly jeopardized in spite of the continued 
excess of commercial exports over imports. 
Nor, for that matter, does the continued move-
ment away from the dollar reflect a weakening of 
America's position as a creditor nation. In 1940 the 
U.S. was a debtor nation; long term assets and in-
vestments held by foreigners in the United States in 
that year totalled $13.5 billions-almost $1.3 bil-
lions greater than American investments abroad. 
This debtor status persisted through 1945. But by 
1950, America had become a massive creditor with 
$32.8 billions of investment assets abroad, com-
pared with $19.5 billions of foreign investment 
assets in the U.S. This position of $13.3 billions of 
creditor status in 1950 grew enormously, so that by 
1961 the U.S. had become a creditor on long-term 
account to the tune of $27.3 billions. 
Yet gold has continued to seep out of the coun-
try. This happens, not because governments and busi-
ness organizations overseas mistrust the basic credit 
standing of the United States, but because they have 
come to mistrust profoundly the ability of the dollar 
to continue to serve as the foundation currency of 
the world's monetary system, in view of the fiscal 
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policies consistently pursued by this country. 
The situation is classic. For just as U. S. Govern-
ment expenditures in foreign countries are offset by 
a favorable balance of merchandise trade, so the 
massive creditor status of the U. S. on long-term in-
vestment account is offset by her debtor status on 
short-term account. Short-term liabilities to for-
eigners reported by banks in the U.S. as of Decem-
ber, 1962 amounted to $25 billions, of which $12.3 
billions consisted of U. S. Treasury bills and certif-
icates. Short-term claims on foreigners reported by 
banks in the U.S. totalled only $5.1 billions, leaving 
the U.S. a net debtor on these short-term accounts 
to the extent of $19.9 billions. Here is where the 
difficulties lie. 
The situation resembles that of Great Britain. 
That once-dominant nation was forced off the gold 
standard in 1929-1931 because of her inability to 
realize her long-term foreign investments in time to 
stem the flight of gold as short-term liabilities were 
pressed upon her for payment. 
The United States today is in much the same posi-
tion. Rising costs-of-living, increased production 
prices, unsatisfactory returns upon industrial invest-
ment, and resulting industrial stagnation - inescap-
able accompaniments of persisting inflation induced 
by fantastically costly arms expenditures financed by 
debt increases - have caused American capital to 
seek more profitable and more secure investment 
opportunities abroad. Hence the $27 billions of net 
credit on long-term investments overseas. The self-
same factors have caused foreigners to keep their 
dollar holdings in short-term forms, and not to con-
vert them into long-term investments in the U. S. 
These foreigners are understandably fearful that the 
decline of the dollar cannot be arrested while the 
U. S. national debt continues to mount and the for-
eign exchange earned from trade is prevented, by 
fiscal and military policies, extravagance abroad and 
at home, from being converted into Treasury bal-
ances. 
THE SOLUTION LIES IN CURBING 
MILITARY SPENDING 
The gold problem is of America's own making. 
The solution must be of her own finding. Prompt 
and major reduction of arms budgets for both home 
and overseas forces, with the bulk of the savings 
going to bolster U. S. gold reserves, are prerequisites 
to remedying the situation. Or, such expenditures 
must be paid out of current taxation, not out of debt 
increases, no matter how unpalatable a rise in taxa-
tion may be., 
Whoever fears that the adoption of such a drastic 
surgical policy toward the national budget may 
weaken U.S. influence in the world, might reflect on 
the British experience. The decline in England's 
position as a great power dates, not from the end of 
World War II, but from the time the international 
financial community recognized that England could 
no longer meet her short-term obligations with 
assurance, and that sterling could no longer serve as 
the base of the international monetary order. 
Once thoroughly weakened, world financial power 
cannot easily be regained. The U.S. has attained a 
world position through the integrity of her currency. 
She will lose this, together with the ability to shape 
much of the world's political future, if the flight of 
gold is not soon halted. This can be done only by 
curbing the extraordinary extravagance in the mili-
tary area, and by strengthening the U.S. fiscal posi-
tion so that short-term claims upon her gold reserves 
will be transformed into long-term foreign invest-
ments in the American industrial system. 
Statistical data sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin (monthly); 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (annual). 
5. WHICH WAY SECURITY? HOW WE CAN COUNTER 
GROWING INSTABILITY IN THE UNDER-
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
by OTTO FEINSTEIN* 
The foreign economic and military practices of 
the United States have not addressed themselves suc-
cessfully to the key problems of the 1950's and 
1960's. Chaos, instability, and the threat of nuclear 
war, based on the poverty in the under-developed 
countries is increasing. The United States could 
direct its resources in a way that will add substan-
tially to the security of this country even as it ex-
tends the opportunity for greater economic and 
political freedom to that , two-thirds of the world's 
population living in misery and squalor. 
The burden of this paper will be to indicate that: 
- the under-developed countries are the major 
source of world instability, presenting threats 
to world security that are not susceptible of 
military solution. 
- unless present trends are reversed, the eco-
nomic gap between developed and under-
developed countries will continue to widen. 
- foreign aid from the developed countries has 
been niggardly compared to the funds allocated 
for military efforts. 
- there are means of using foreign aid that prom-
ise enduring benefits. 
- such expenditures address themselves to the 
key problems of world security. 
- the U.S. has more to gain from such construc-
tive efforts than from continuing to add to its 
military overkill capability. 
POVERTY, UNREST THREATEN WORLD'S SECURITY 
Since 1945, there has been no military conquest 
of any important area that was not an outgrowth of 
World War II. All the troubles since 1945 have 
arisen from the disequilibria resulting from the 
breakup of previously under-developed empires, 
anti-colonial disturbances in the under-developed 
areas, or revolts against military regimes in those 
areas. 
47 countries that have been "trouble spots": 
Laos, Vietnam, Algeria, Argentina, Arabia, Boli-
via, Brazil, Cyprus, Ghana, Rhodesias, British 
Guiana, Borneo, Malaya, Pakistan, Burma, China, 
Congo, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Korea, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Phil-
ippines, Portugal, Angola, South Africa, Spain, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey , Venezuela, and Yemen. 
Poverty and unrest in these under-developed areas 
is the major cause of world instability. (The Rus-
* Assistant Professor, Monteith College, Wayne State University; 
(Ed.) Two Worlds of Change, Monteith College, 1962; "De-
velopment Policy and Time," Journal of the Brazilian Army, 
Feb., 1960; research for U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, U.S. 
Business and Labor in Latin America, Wash., D.C., 1960. 
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sian and Chinese revolutions can also be traced to 
problems of instability in under-developed countries 
under severe political strain.) The military problems 
that may have existed, or may now exist, arose out 
of the economic, political, and social problems of 
under-development. 
The overkill capability which has been developed 
by the world's annual $120 billions military budgets 
has' not and cannot resolve the problems in the 
under-developed countries. Few of the "trouble 
spots" may be said to have presented a basically 
military problem. In all these cases, the use of mili-
tary force has been, at best, a temporary solution 
and often an irrelevant one. As a matter of fact, the 
massive use of capital, technology, and human skill 
for military purposes aggravates the problems of the 
under-developed areas by increasing the scarcity of 
these resources and thus raising their price. 
ECONOMIC GAP THREATENS TO WIDEN FURTHER 
That two-thirds of humanity live in wretched 
poverty has been the subject of much commentary, 
in recent years. However, the basic and alarming 
feature of this problem has yet to be recognized: the 
gap between the developed and the under-developed 
countries is increasing. 
Over the past 18 years, while more than 60 
under-developed nations have gained independence, 
national efforts and international co-operation in 
their development have so far failed to bring about 
the desired acceleration of economic growth. The 
average growth in per-capita income over the past 
decade was less than 2 % and possibly as little as 
1 %. The average level of real income per capita in 
the under-developed countries is now less than one-
sixth-and in many cases less than one-tenth-that 
enjoyed in such countries as Belgium, Norway and 
the United Kingdom. 
A study of the trends in per capita income (see 
Table 1 following text) in major areas of the world 
clearly indicates the widening of the gap between 
the developed and under-developed nations. The 
predicted population growth (Table 2) 1 will further 
aggravate this situation. Even according to a mod-
erate hypothesis of this growth the population in the 
developed zone of the world will grow by 53 % 
while that of the under-developed areas will increase 
by 146% by the year 2000. This means that the 
proportion of people living in the presently devel-
oped areas will drop from 33.9% to 22.9%, while 
the proportion of those living in the under-devel-
10 
oped areas will rise from 66.1 % to 77.1 % of the 
world population. 
Furthermore, food production per capita has actu-
ally been declining or rising only minutely in these 
areas (see Table 3). And while three-fifths of the 
human species lives in these areas, they produce 
only one-third of the world's agricultural output. 
While the bulk of humanity is thus slipping into 
poverty, rather than evolving out of it, the major 
industrial nations, as well as the under-developed 
ones, have been spending increasing sums on mili-
tary budgets. Despite the obvious and inherent dan-
gers in such a continued trend, the absolute gap 
between the rich and the poor countries has been 
widening. 
FOREIGN AID INSIGNIFICANT BESIDE 
MILITARY BUDGET 
In the fiscal year of 1959-1960 over $120 billions 
was spent for direct military purposes. 2 This sum is 
between 66% and 100% of the total national in-
come for all under-developed countries during that 
year. Total world foreign aid and assistance has 
never reached 10% of the world military budget. 
U.S. aid has accounted for more than 75% of all 
foreign aid. But all U.S. foreign aid from July 1945 
to December 1961 was only one-and-a-half times 
the size of one year's American military budget. A 
large share of even this modest amount of aid has 
gone either to developed countries or for military 
assistance. In all, the U. S. has spent $33 billions 
during the past 17 years for non-military aid to the 
under-developed countries. (Table 4) 3 
In proportion to U.S. productivity, however, our 
share of foreign economic aid has been small. If we 
take 1959, and ask what share of the national in-
come of the developed nations went to the under-
developed nations in the form of economic aid, we 
find that France led with 1.9% and was followed by 
the U.S. with 0.7 0;0 , the United Kingdom with 0.5 %, 
and West Germany with 0.3 70 . If the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and West Germany had given 
the same per cent of their national income as France, 
foreign aid for 1959 would have been $10.7 bil-
lions rather than the $4 billions which it actually 
was. Even such a sum would have been quite a bit 
1 United Nations, Accroissement de la population mondiale dans 
['avenir, 1961. 
2 United Nations, Economic and Social Consequences of Dis-
armament, New York, 1962. 
:I Source: U. S. Department of Commerce. 
less than 10% of the military budgets for that year 
(see Table 5). 
NEED FOR CAREFULLY ALLOCATED FOREIGN AID 
Four estimates have been made as to the total 
amount of foreign capital required by the under-
developed areas, over and above their domestic re-
sources devoted to investment. 1 These estimates 
range from $6 billions to $10 billions annually. 
After allowing for the present flow of foreign capi-
tal,2 there is a current deficiency between $3 billion 
and $6 billions a year if the modest annual rate of 
growth of 2 % in per capita income is to be achieved. 
Even this would be but a minimal program. In es-
sence, the only answer to the massive problems of 
the under-developed areas is to increase the produc-
tivity of their labor, natural resources, and capital. 
Economic theory now indicates that investment 
in human capital is the key to economic develop-
ment with productivity and capital formation as 
secondary results. Thus, the most effective invest-
ment of foreign aid would be in education-primary, 
secondary, vocational, and technical. 
A number of advantages would flow from educa-
tional aid. Teachers and intellectuals could obtain 
constructive employment; the influence of the ide-
ologies of violence would be reduced; and a middle 
class would be either created or enlarged. Further-
more, the bulk of the people would be given some-
thing concrete: advancement for their children and 
the possibility of their own advancement. The funds 
spent for education would aid in the development of 
an effective consumer market even as they stimu-
lated labor productivity and trimmed production 
costs. 
Nor would this have to be a permanent hand-out. 
The program can be instituted in such a way that 
our share declines over the years. Popular pressure 
would be the factor guaranteeing continual educa-
tion outlays by the local government, particularly as 
more people are educated, more schools are built 
and more teachers are trained. 
Finally such a program supports social and demo-
graphic stability, creates people who can use the 
parliamentary tools of progress, increases those 
whose interests are jn more limited family size, adds 
value to labor by making it more productive, and 
creates markets for domestic and foreign entre-
preneurs. 
From past experience with foreign aid, it is evi-
dent that billions of dollars can be used without 
establishing any permanent stability or growth. It is 
therefore essential that aid lead to the point of self-
generating growth. Filling the capital gap by achiev-
ing the aid level of France and investing in an ex-
tensive educational program are two such practical 
aid suggestions. 
FOREIGN TRADE KEY TO DEVELOPMENT 
A key generator of economic development which 
uses the power of the market mechanism to induce 
growth is foreign trade. In 1960 total exports of the 
under-developed areas amounted to four times all 
foreign aid and investment from the industrial 
countries. In most countries more than 20% of the 
national product originates from foreign trade. It 
provides the foreign currency, technology, profits, 
and often government revenues that make internal 
growth possible. 
But here too the gap between the rich and the 
poor is widening. The under-developed areas' share 
in world exports has declined from 32% in 1953 to 
25 % in 1960. Total exports since 1956 from the 
under-developed countries have increased by only 
2 % while those from industrial areas have grown by 
6.5 %. While the pattern of trade has shifted from 
export of primary commodities and import of man-
ufactured consumer goods, to export of primary 
commodities and import of capital goods (a positive 
development), the value of raw materials per dollar 
output of the industrial countries has declined. In 
1900 raw materials comprised 22Y2 cents of every 
$1 output of the U. S. economy; in 1960 only 11112 
cents of every dollar output consisted of raw mate-
rials value. This decline has been most rapid since 
1940. The extreme fluctuations of raw material 
prices has also seriously affected the economic stabil-
ity of the under-developed countries. GATT esti-
mates that billions of dollars have been lost due to 
these fluctuations. 
1 United Nations, The Capital Development Needs of the Less 
Developed Countries. 
United Nations, Measures for the Economic Development of 
Underdeveloped Countries, 1952. 
Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, A Proposal, Key to an 
Effective Foreign Policy, New York, 1956. 
Paul G. Hoffman, One Hundred Countries, One and One-
Quarter Billion People, Washington, 1960. 
P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Under-de-
veloped Countries," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol-
ume XLIII, May 1961. 
2 During the past few years, the total net flow of capital 
from private-enterprise-developed countries to under-devel-
oped areas averaged between $3.5 billion and $4 billion 
annually. Half represented official grants and the remainder 
consisted mostly of private lending. 
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The removal of U. S. restrictions against primary 
products from Latin America would result in in-
creased yearly earnings for that area of $850 mil-
lions to $1.7 billion a year. Rapid economic growth 
in the U.S. and the opening of U.S. markets for the 
under-developed areas' products would be the great-
est aid to their development. 
A reduction of the overkill budget resulting in a 
sizeable tax cut could help provide such an increase 
in U.S. economic activity. The utilization of the 
vast research talent, now in the defense area, for 
mapping development plans and producing new and 
low cost capital goods would greatly facilitate trade, 
efficiency and growth. 
U.S. GROWTH ESSENTIAL To WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT 
Representatives and officials charged with allocat-
ing our nation's wealth in a way that will best pro-
tect our freedom and our security should have a 
clear idea of the threats which jeopardize these cher-
ished rights. It is the belief of this author that events 
since 1945, as well as the obvious problems loom-
ing on the horizon, indicate that the threat is cur-
rently more closely connected with the problems of 
under-development than with those of direct mili-
tary or nuclear attack. It would seem folly to divert 
funds and talents in a direction where the problems 
seem to be coming under control while practically 
ignoring the vast and complex problems facing us. 
It is fortunate that the solution of the problems 
of under-development would help resolve some of 
our internal problems, such as unemployment and 
insufficient economic growth. . 
A program of foreign aid in the form of bank 
credits, grants for massive educational efforts, and 
accelerated foreign trade will lead to economic 
progress, political stability, and social development 
in the under-developed areas. Such conditions would 
inevitably encourage the flow of private direct for-
eign investments and might even lead to the rebirth 
of long-term portfolio investments and other capital 
market features. 
If such changes are not made, or if only half-
hearted measures are taken, then social unrest, in-
creasing instability, and guerilla wars will plague us 
within a very short time. 
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TABLE 1 
Population (millions) 
1960 1975 1990 
Africa ........................... .... . 235 303 410 
Asia (Not Japan) .... ..... .. . 1,525 2,093 2,951 
South America .............. ... . 139 204 304 
Central America ............. . 66 99 151 
Total Under-developed .. 1,965 2,699 3,816 
Japan .............................. .. 95 117 139 
USSR ............................... . 215 275 339 
Europe ............................ . . 424 476 540 
North America ............. .. . 197 240 283 
Oceania ............. .......... .. . .. 16 21 26 
Total Developed .......... .. 947 1,129 1,327 
Grand Total .............. .. 2,912 3,828 5,143 
TABLE 2 
Food and Agricultural Production per Capita 
1948/49 1953/54 
2000 
517 
3,717 
394 
198 
4,826 
153 
389 
568 
312 
30 
1,452 
6,278 
Before to to 1958/ 1959/ 
U1ar 1952/53 1957/58 1959 1960 
Western Europe .................. 100 96 110 113 117 
East Europe and USSR. ....... 100 108 123 145 145 
North America ....... ............. 100 112 110 111 111 
Latin America .. .................... 100 91 93 97 96 
Oceania ................................ 100 95 95 102 100 
Far East (Not China) ........ .. 100 84 92 94 95 
Near East ............................ 100 99 109 114 112 
Africa ............ .. .............. .. ...... 100 102 107 105 102 
All areas ........ .. .............. .. 100 99 106 113 113 
Under-developed areas ...... 100 91 97 99 98 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization, World Food and 
Agricultural Report (1960), p. 14. 
TABLE 3 
Trend of Per Capita National Income in Major Areas 
1913 
North America 
(Excluding Mexico) .. .. 
Oceania ....................... ...... . 
Northwestern Europe ...... .. 
Soviet Union (USSR) .... .. 
Union of South Africa .... .. 
Southeast Europe ............ .. 
Latin America ................ .. 
$917 
572 
454 
162 
177 
200 
170 
Japan ....................... ... .. ..... . 
Far East (excluding 
China and Japan) ........ .. 
Southeast Asia ........ .. ....... . 
China ................. ............ .. .. . 
North America 
(excluding Mexico) ......... . 
Oceania ...... ...... ..................... . 
Northwestern Europe .......... .. 
Soviet Union (USSR) ......... . 
Union of South Africa ......... . 
Southeast Europe ................ .. 
Latin America ...................... .. 
Japan .......................... ........... . 
Far East (excluding 
China and Japan) ...... ....... . 
Southeast Asia ................... . .. 
China ....... ............................ .. . 
85 
93 
65 
50 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1929 
$1,243 
680 
528 
178 
221 
181 
196 
152 
106 
68 
50 
1952-53 
$1,810 
964 
681 
535 
300 
285 
260 
184 
109 
64 
50 
Index (1913==100) 
136 197 
119 169 
116 150 
110 330 
125 169 
91 143 
115 153 
179 216 
114 117 
105 98 
100 100 
1957 
$1,868 
1,110 
790 
750 
318 
360 
300 
240 
115 
67 
61 
204 
194 
174 
463 
180 
180 
176 
282 
124 
103 
122 
Note: Figures in dollars of 1952-54, not corrected for differences 
in price levels between countries. 
Source: L. J. Zimmerman, Arme en rijke landen, Albani, The 
Hague, 1960, pp. 29-31; from Jan Tinbergen, Shaping 
the World Economy, Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, p. 9. 
TABLE 4 
United States Foreign Aid (in billions of dollars) 
1 July 1945 to 31 December 1961 
Total 1961-57 
Net non-military grants ........ 36.8 8·4 
Net credits .............. ............ 12.8 1.9 
Net other aid (PL480, etc.) 3.0 1.9 
Net military grants ... .. ... .... .. 29.3 10.2 
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce. 
TABLE 5 
1956-51 
11.2 
1.6 
1.1 
17.2 
1950-45 
17.2 
9.3 
2.0 
Foreign Aid from 1954-59 (in millions of dollars) 
West Germanyl ........ 274.5 Australia .. .. . 181.6 
Belgium ...... . 54.2 Canada .................... 215.3 
TABLE 5 (Cont.) 
France ..... ................ . 
Italyl ....................... . 
Japanl ..................... . 
Netherlands ............ .. 
Switzerland ....... .. ... .. 
USSR and bloc2 ....... . 
2,825.9 
72.9 
53.2 
133.0 
.6 
342.0 
Denmark ........ ..... ..... .7 
U.S.A . .. .. .................. 12,025.5 
]'J')rway .................... 6.1 
l\ew Zealand .......... .. 23.3 
United Kingdom .. .... 1,058.7 
Sweden ...................... 4.3 
Total-$18,271.9 
Source: Department of State Bulletin, 22 August 1960 and J. S. 
Berliner So viet Economic Aid, Praeger, New York, 1959. 
1 Germany paid $428 million, Japan $200 million, and Italy $181 
million in reparations to under-developed nations. 
2 Soviet and Eastern bloc figures are from 1953-57. 
6. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF 
DOUBTFUL VALUE IN LATIN AMERICA 
by EDWIN LIEUWEN* 
Despite more than a decade of operation of the 
present United States military assistance program in 
Latin America, the military power and war-making 
potential of those nations to the south counts for 
practically nothing. The Latin American armed 
forces have shown a marked unwillingness to com-
bat collectively the communist threat 'either from 
without or from within the region itself. For in-
stance, only Colombia responded to the U. S. call 
to arms in Korea. And there was little concerted 
action in the case of Guatemala during the period 
1950-1954 or in the case of Cuba today. Thus, as a 
purely military proposition, the concept of collec-
tive planning and defense would seem to have little 
or no practical application. 
The purpose of this paper is to review briefly the 
elements of the U.S. military assistance program in 
Latin America and to appraise its effects on both 
the U. S. and Latin America. From this case-study, 
it is possible to draw conclusions on the value of 
such programs in a vital region of the world. 
U.S. MILITARY AID PROGRAM Is EXTENSIVE 
Under the U.S. Mutual Security Act, military 
assistance to Latin America is granted for the pur-
pose of obtaining the cooperation of that area in re-
sisting any threat to security of the hemisphere. The 
assumption is that there is a threat by communist 
aggressors both fro~ without and within and that 
resisting that threat is a common responsibility. 
This collective defense machinery consists of: 
1. A military a1liance-The Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in 1947. 
2. A collective defense planning organization-
The Inter-American Defense Board. 
3. A U. S.-sponsored military nusslon system 
under which the armies, navies, and air forces 
of all the republics, except Mexico and Cuba, 
receive training and instruction from U. S. 
military personnel. 
4. A military school program for Latin American 
officers and men at institutions in the U. S. and 
the Canal Zone. 
5. Military assistance grants in the amount of ap-
proximately $55 million annually to eleven 
countries - Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Chile, 
Brazil, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Nica-
ragua, Honduras, Haiti, and Guatemala-with 
whom the U. S. has military defense assistance 
pacts. 
6. Credit sales of military equipment in the 
amount of approximately $25 million annu-
ally to all the Latin American countries except 
Cuba under the reimbursable aid provisions of 
the Mutual Security Act. 
7. Sales of U. S. military equipment in virtually 
unlimited quantities at bargain prices. 
OBJECTIVES OF PROGRAM ARE MAINLY POLITICAL 
Though expressed in military terms, the objec-
tives of the U.S. military assistance program for 
Latin America are primarily political. Realistically 
recognizing the major role played by Latin Amer-
ica's armed forces in the internal political life of 
* Professor of Latin American History, University of New . 
Mexico; Arms and Politics in Latin America, Praeger, New 
York (1961); Penezuela, Oxford University Press, London 
( 1961); Co-author with Miguel Horrin of U.S.-Latin American 
Relations: Post-World War II Political Developments in Latin 
America, 86th Congress, 1959. 
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their respective countries and recognizing their de-
sire for arms, the U. S., during the past decade, has 
been granting military assistance primarily as a quid 
pro quo for Latin America's friendship and coopera-
tion. Military assistance has been frequently justified 
on the ground that it helps preserve internal stabil-
ity in Latin America. 
While it is true that the U. S. influence over Latin 
America's armed forces helps exclude Soviet in-
fluence there, it is questionable whether our secur-
ity position is always thereby advanced. In countries 
where the military now dominate politics, such as 
Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Guate-
mala, the primary opponent of the armed forces is 
internal civilian opposition rather than world-wide 
communism. 
Latin America's armed forces have frequently 
employed the equipment sold or granted by the U. S. 
to overwhelm civilian political organizations. 
"In Brazil, for example, following the receipt of 
nearly $300 millions in Lend-Lease equipment and 
the sending of a token expeditionary force to Italy 
during World War II, the armed forces assumed the 
right to depose President Vargas when the war was 
over. According to Laurence Duggan, the United 
States equipment and experience in European fight-
ing built up the role of the officer corps in the coun-
try's politics; thenceforth they began making and 
breaking governments. Again in 1954, following 
receipt of more military aid and the assumption of 
a new defense-of-the-hemisphere role with the sign-
ing of the 1953 MDA Pact, they arrogated to them-
selves the right to depose Vargas again, although 
this time he had been freely elected to the presi-
dency. 
In Colombia, prior to the military coup of 1953, 
the army had been receiving both grant and reim-
bursable aid from the United States. The officer 
corps, its confidence bolstered both by its fighting 
role in the Korean War and by its assumption of 
the task of 'preserving order' during the civil war, 
could not resist the temptation to seize power. 
United States military aid must certainly be con-
sidered as one contributing factor that helped to tip 
this balance, bring the Colombian army back into 
politics after a half-century of civilian rule ... 
The strengthening of the armed forces, for de-
fense or for preserving internal order, seems only to 
give encouragement to the Latin American officer 
corps to convert themselves into even more highly 
political instruments than they are already. The in-
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tentions of the donor are, as in the past, perverted 
by the recipients."l 
Recently, Senator Ernest Gruening (Dem. 
Alaska) reported that: 
"1. A military coup overthrew the existing govern-
ment of Peru last July even as the Presidential elec-
tion ballots were being counted. Army officers in-
vaded the Pizarro Palace, seized and imprisoned 
President Manuel Prado and established themselves 
in power. 
The tank which crashed through the palace gates 
was a Sherman tank made in the United States and 
supplied by us to Peru as a part of our military-aid 
program. The officer who carried out the capture of 
the palace, Colonel Gonzalo Briceno, was trained 
at Fort Benning, Georgia. Others of the junta and 
of its military cabinet likewise received their train-
ing in the United States. Several had been only re-
cently awarded the U. S. Legion of Merit: in their 
citations, services to the 'objectives of democracy' 
were stressed. 
Seven candidates had been vying for the Presi-
dency in Peru; three were closely bunched far in the 
lead. They were General Manuel Ordia, a former 
President who had come into power in 1948 through 
a military coup; Fernando Belaunde, candidate of 
the Popular Action Party; and Raul Haya de la 
Torre, long the head of the moderate left-wing anti-
Communist APRA Party. None of these had secured 
quite the one-third of all the votes cast required by 
the Peruvian constitution, which provides that in 
such an event election shall be by the Congress. The 
military apparently feared tl:lat Haya de la Torre 
would be chosen and would institute what to them 
were objectionable social and economic reforms. To 
prevent this they took over. 
The Kennedy Administration promptly an-
nounced that aid to Peru under our foreign aid pro-
gram would be suspended, and withheld recognition 
of the new government. 
2. Several weeks earlier, a similar sequence of 
events had taken place in Argentina. There the mili-
tary, dissatisfied with the results of the general elec-
tions, seized President Frondizi, imprisoned him on 
an island and installed a creature of their own, Jose 
Guido, in his place. The Kennedy Administration, 
however, recognized the new Argentine regime and 
1 Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, Praeger, 
New York (1961), pp. 230, 231. 
continued its aid. Shortly thereafter, several hundred 
million dollars were pledged."l 
Although reluctant to fight communism abroad, 
the various forces of the Latin American military 
have not hesitated to use U.S. given equipment to 
conduct internecine warfare. During the November 
1961 political crisis in Ecuador, air force jets bat-
tled army tanks and troops in downtown Quito. In 
June, 1962, army tanks, troops, and air force jet 
fighters battled a marine corps battalion for control 
of the Puerto Cabello Naval Base in Venezuela. 
Three months later, the cavalry (tank) branch of 
the army and the air force successfully fought the 
infantry, which was supported by the navy, in the 
streets of Buenos Aires for control of the Argentine 
government. And in November of 1962 the air 
force battled the army for three hours in Guatemala 
City, the main casualties being innocent civilian 
bystanders. 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTES LITTLE 
TO DEMOCRACY 
Does military assistance thwart the progress of 
democracy in Latin America? Insofar as military 
aid programs have increased the political influence 
of the armed forces, the prospects for democracy 
appear to have suffered. The military tends to resort 
to non-democratic procedures to achieve internal 
order and stability, which both the local military 
and the U.S., for different reasons, ardently desire. 
The 1962 military take-over from freely elected 
civilian governments in Argentina and Peru are 
cases in point. 
Does the political advantage of gaining the co-
operation of Latin America's armed forces with 
military assistance outweigh the disadvantages of 
alienating democratic civilian elements by the con-
tinuance of such aid? It matters little whether the 
U. S. arms are really the determining factor in pro-
voking military intervention in internal politics. The 
point is that most civilian elements believe this is 
true. 
It should be borne in mind that U. S. military as-
sistance to Latin America is supported only by that 
area's military forces comprising less than 0.5 % of 
its total population. Most civilian forces are opposed 
to these programs, fearing their own armed forces 
far more than they do the Russians. 
Finally, our military assistance programs in Latin 
America appear incompatible with social reform 
objectives of the Alliance for Progress. This would 
seem to be the case wherever military assistance 
tends to abet the kind of stability that puts a damper 
on social change and reform. 
We should be extremely wary of conservative 
forces' solicitude for military assistance, for their 
aim is to use it not to halt Soviet aggression from 
without, but rather to suppress social change from 
within. In Nicaragua, Argentina, Peru, Paraguay, 
Ecuador, and Guatemala, where an unintended ef-
fect of U. S. military assistance has been to stifle 
reform, the result has been to break down the 
barriers between the Communists and true demo-
cratic forces, both of which tend to see their im-
mediate enemy as the military of their own coun-
try. As the recent case of Cuba has amply demon-
strated, the Communists are quick to seize the oppor-
tunity to cooperate and make common cause with 
the democratic civilian resistance to militarism. 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL FRUSTRATE 
"ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS" 
Conclusions expressed by this writer three years 
ago still hold true: "For the great majority of Latin 
Americans, who see no great danger of aggression 
from outside, the U.S. military program compounds 
their internal problems, interferes with the process 
of social change, and hinders progress in economic 
development. The reimbursible aid program, the 
evils of which are magnified by the new credit 
policies, gives license to the armed forces to squan-
der money on flashy military 'toys' ... the provision 
of U. S. arms to military regimes often stymies the 
popular urge to political freedom."2 
Viewed in retrospect, the present military assist-
ance program for Latin America is a somewhat 
anachronistic carry-over of a fundamental decision 
made 15 years ago. At that time our cold war policy 
for Latin America reflected the strong military in-
fluence prevailing in our foreign policy. 
In 1947 the Defense Department proposed to in-
clude Latin America in our cold-war strategy via 
alliances, arms, aid, bases, and a general military 
build-up. The late Gen. George C. Marshall, then 
Secretary of State, overruled his subordinates and 
accepted the military proposal. Thereafter, as the 
cold war intensified, military and strategic consid-
erations were increasingly emphasized in U.S. for-
1 Ernest Gruening, "Exporting Trouble," The Nation, October 
6, 1962. 
2 Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, Praeger, 
New York (1961), pp. 240. 
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eign policy toward Latin America. 
The subsequent social crisis in Latin America, 
however, has made the military considerations in-
creasingly untenable. The political freedom, social 
reform, and economic development principles out-
lined in the "Alliance for Progress" program appear 
to be inconsistent with our military assistance pro-
grams in Latin America. Unless this inconsistency 
is removed, frustration and failure may crown our 
whole Latin American policy. 
7. CIVILIAN MARKETS FOR U.S. MILITARY INDUSTRY 
by JOHN E. ULLMANN* 
Reduction of military spending to a maintenance-
of-present-forces level would result in a budget cut 
of $22 billion. As this represents a substantial 
amount of economic activity, we feel it incumbent 
on us to suggest alternative markets and activities. 
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest alterna-
tive expenditures. Their sum exceeds the proposed 
reduction by a substantial margin. 
But first it should be noted that it would not be 
necessary to seek alternatives for the full amount if 
it were deemed fiscally advisable to convert some of 
the saving into a tax cut. For example, such a policy 
might permit sustaining the entire tax-cut program 
proposed by the Administration - $13.6 billions-
without administrative and legislative countervailing 
moves that would partially neutralize it. In line with 
this kind of reasoning, the President's Labor Man-
agement Committee in the fall of 1962 recom-
mended a $10 billions cut without concurrent re-
form. 
SOME ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE 
SELF-LIQUIDATING 
The alternatives that will be suggested involve 
government initiative in varying degrees, but not 
necessarily the federal government. Some activities 
such as urban renewal are probably best handled on 
a local or regional basis. Some of the alternatives 
envisioned are self-liquidating and may be carried 
out by private enterprise. These alternatives would 
replace the military procurement which is supported 
entirely by the federal government. Such procure-
ment, of course, represents expenditures that do not 
return their capital outlay. 
The alternatives differ considerably in the extent 
to which they can be used to employ existing staffs, 
managements, and facilities. It is desirable to con-
serve existing institutions, whether they be firms or 
government agencies, by finding them other tasks. 
This is important in order to prevent stranding of 
populations and dislocations of the kind that are dif-
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ficult to cope with on the local political level. Indi-
vidual conversion problems would occur, but would 
be susceptible of solution, provided an adequate 
level of economic activity was maintained. 
SCHOOLS NEED $5 BILLIONS MORE A YEAR 
In 1961, expenditures for public primary and sec-
ondary schools was at a level of $455 per pupil. This 
outlay included capital improvements which made 
up about 17 % of the total. Increasing these per-
capita expenditures to a level approximately half-
way between the national average and that for the 
highest state (New York), would require about $5 
billions. Raising them to the New York level ($678) 
would mean an extra $9 billions. An increase of 
approximately $8 billions per year was recently sug-
gested by the American Association of School Ad-
ministrators. 
At least one-third of these amounts could now be 
profitably invested in new teaching aids such as edu-
cational television and other audio-visual aids, thus 
providing a market for the electronics industry. 
An additional $500 millions should be earmarked 
for further aid to higher education. This would be 
in the form of scholarships for technical specialists 
previously associated solely with military work to 
enable them to retrain for equivalent professional 
jobs in non-military endeavors. 
$10 BILLIONS NEEDED FOR URBAN RENEWAL 
Estimates on the need for urban renewal vary 
greatly and range up to the complete rebuilding of 
large sectors of all our metropolitan areas. Expendi-
tures up to $110 billions a year have been sug-
gested. 1 No effort of this size could be mounted 
* Professor of Management; Chairman Department of Manage-
ment, Marketing and Business Statistics, Hofstra University; 
professional engineer; consultant in urban planning and indus-
trial development; "Economics of Nuclear Power," Science, 
April 4, 1958; "Depreciation, Equipment Prices and Income 
Tax," Engineering Economist, Spring 1960. 
1 U. S. News & World Report, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 70. 
promptly without gravely dislocating the entire con-
struction industry, currently operating at a rate of 
$70 billions annually. This figure includes private 
and public construction and maintenance. However, 
additional construction expenditures on the order 
of $10- to $15-billions would be in order without 
severe dislocation of the industry. With preparation, 
the industry could be expanded to handle a much 
greater work load. The $10- to $15-billions figure 
would represent an expansion of construction activ-
ities of 14 % to 21 %, allowing for the elimination of 
military construction which now runs about $1.2 
billions a year. 
The new scale of effort would be substantially 
more than is currently planned. For fiscal year 1964, 
total federal outlays for housing and community de-
velopment are estimated at $276 millions, excluding 
the trust funds of Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation. I 
Existing industry in the military fie ld could pro-
vide manufacturing capacity for prefabricated units 
and the required administrative and planning staffs. 
$4 BILLIONS NEEDED TO RECLAIM DAMAGED LAND 
The total damaged land of the United States has 
been estimated at 778 million acres.2 A further 280 
million acres have been rendered useless for agricul-
ture. Assuming that all activities of the Army Corps 
of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation are 
directed toward conservation, the average reclama-
tion expenditure is $1.04 an acre. This amount could 
certainly be increased. An expenditure of $5 per 
acre of damaged and ruined land would represent an 
added expenditure of $4 billions. This is little 
enough for land improvement. Substantial increase 
of effort will be urgently needed before the end of 
the next two decades if suburban settlement con-
tinues encroaching on farm land.3 
URBAN TRANSIT WOULD REQUIRE $500 MILLIONS 
Plans for mass urban transit have been made by 
many metropolitan areas and have reached the stage 
of specific plans in several localities. Annual ex-
penditures envisioned for a few l,?calities are as 
follows: 
Bay Area (San Francisco) ... .. . 
Washington, D. C ..... .. .... ...... ... . 
New York City-Nassau County 
All others .................. ..... ..... .. .. . . 
Total ... .... ... ..... .. ........ ... .. ..... . 
$100 millions 
100 millions 
100 millions 
200 millions 
$500 millions 
These projects are in various stages of planning 
and financing. As noted, funds for these largely self-
liquidating projects do not necessarily have to come 
from federal sources. 
Transit systems also offer opportunities to elec-
tronics firms in the supply of controls. The vehicle 
market thus created is already attracting sectors of 
the airframe industry, in addition to regular sup-
pliers. 
$1.5 BILLIONS COULD BE USED 
FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
Federal public health expenditures for fiscal year 
1964 are estimated at $1.6 billions. This amount is 
an 18 % increase over fiscal year 1963 appropria-
tions. Even so, the fiscal 1964 federal budget points 
to the inadequacy of medical staffs, the need for 
more hospitals, and the modernizing of existing 
facilities. A further $1.5 billions could justifiably be 
spent. This would include substantial amounts fOl 
up-to-date diagnostic equipment and the automa-
tion of hospital operation, providing potential mar-
kets for firms with electronic capabilities. An effort 
on this scale would speed the solution of major 
mental and physical health problems. 
ALTERNATIVES WOULD REQUIRE 
$32- to $44-BILLIONS 
Summarizjng alternative expenditures suggested 
thus far we have: 
Item Cost (Billions of dollars) 
Education ....... ....... .. ... ....... 5.5 - 9.5 
Urban renewal ...... .. .. ....... . 10.0 - 15.0 
Conservation, soil renewal.. 4.0 
Urban transit ........... ... ...... .5 
Public health ... .... .. .... .... .... . 1.5 
Net tax cut .. ..... ........ ......... 10.0 - 13.6 
Totals ............................ 31.5 - 44.1 
The alternatives proposed could quite easily ac· 
commodate cuts of $22 billions that would be pos-
sible with a maintenance-of-present-forces budget. 
The programs suggested are based on activities 
likely to be of vital national importance in the 
future. 
There is pent-up demand for a wide variety of 
rehabilitation and recreational projects-ridding our 
air and our streams of pollution, developing our 
park areas, protecting our shores agah?-st erosion-
that would require a wide variety of research and 
I Federal Budget for Fiscal 1964, p. 92. 
2 R. Rienow, American Problems Today, D. C. Heath, Boston 
(1958). 
3 E. F. Higbee, The Squeeze, Morrow, New York (1960). 
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mechanical skills and a healthy boost in expendi-
tures. Desalination of sea water, for which the In-
terior Department now has some pilot projects 
(1964 Budget request is 12 million dollars) is but 
one activity that would have national and inter-
national significance, and which could be funded 
from savings in the military budget. 
Altogether, the reallocation of military expendi-
tures as suggested in this paper would permit con-
siderable choice as to method of organizing the in-
vestment of capital. The adoption of any of these 
alternatives would have a tonic effect on the econ-
omy and would allow us to proceed with long-de-
ferred projects of rehabilitation and improvement. 
8. A NEGLECTED HOME MARKET- 38 MILLION 
AMERICANS IN POVERTY 
by JOHN E. ULLMANN 
" ... for all its wealth and progress the U. S. has still 
too much distress and poverty in its midst, and . . . 
here surely is one frontier which clamors for atten-
tion." 
-J ohn Davenport 
"In the Midst of Plenty" Fortune, March 1961, p. 107 
The task of eliminating poverty in our society has 
languished for the past decade while we have de-
voted ever greater resources to the military effort. A 
redirection of our economy would allow us to cor-
rect these imbalances. 
With nearly 10Yz million families and almost 4 
million unattached individuals living in poverty in 
1960, the total comes to approximately 38 million 
Americans - more than one American in every five. 
The total of those with annual incomes of less 
than half the amount required to place them above 
the poverty level, involving in 1960 nearly 3 V3 mil-
lion families and almost 2 million unattached indi-
viduals, comes to 12Yz million Americans-about 
one in every 14. 
My purpose here is to sketch very briefly some 
aspects of the problem of poverty in the United 
States and to indicate a few approaches to alleviat-
ing the problem. The shift of resources from the 
military to the civilian section of our economy 
would greatly facilitate the elimination of this na-
tional problem. 
SOME AS·PEeTS OF AMERICAN POVERTY 
The number of Americans living in poverty was 
reduced very rapidly from the depression level 
reached in 1935-36 to about 38 million in 1960. 
The number with less than half the income required 
to lift them above the poverty level was reduced to 
about 13 million by 1953, with no further reduction 
by 1960. 
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The nature of poverty has been well described in 
Poverty and Deprivation in the U. S.: The Plight of 
Two-Fifths of a Nation, Conference on Economic 
Progress, Washington, D. C., April, 1962: 
"In 1960, there lived in poverty 43 Yz % of the 
families whose heads were unemployed; 42% of the 
families whose heads were laborers elsewhere than 
on the farm or in the mine; 37% of those whose 
heads were service workers other than in private 
households, and about 58% of those whose heads 
were farm operators. Two-thirds of hired farm work-
ers earned less than $1,000 a year. 
Among families in the South, 68% lived in pov-
erty or deprivation. Among all U.S. nonwhite fam-
ilies, 80% lived in poverty or deprivation. 
Among multiple-person families with heads aged 
65 and over, nearly two-thirds lived in poverty; 
among unattached individuals 65 and over, four-
fifths. Among families whose heads had less than 
eight years of elementary education, only about one-
seventh were above the deprivation level. III health 
and inability to work because of physical defects, 
and substandard housing, are far more concentrated 
among the poor and the deprived than among 
others. 
Stated in another way, looking at all people liv-
ing in poverty in 1960, far more than a fourth were 
in consumer units (families and individuals) where 
the head was not employed. Far more than half 
were in units whose head had eight years of educa-
tion or less; and almost a third were in units whose 
head was female. About a fourth of the total num-
ber of people living in poverty had consumer unit 
heads aged 65 and over. More than a fifth were 
nonwhite. More than a sixth were farm people. 
More than two-fifths lived in the South. 
About two-thirds of all farm workers in 1959 
earned less than $1,000 annually in money wages, 
including not only their earnings from farm work 
but also their earnings from nonfarm work. The 
total number of days worked per year was shock-
ingly low. The average annual money wages were 
only $1,025 for a man and $447 for a woman · for 
migratory workers, and only $1,278 for the man 
and $3! 4 for a woman for nonmigratory workers." 
REDUCTION OF POVERTY, HIGH ECONOMIC 
GROWTH Go HAND IN HAND 
There are those who, giving priority to higher 
economic growth, say that this priority has little 
bearing upon reduction of poverty and deprivation. 
They give as their reason that most or much of these 
low-income conditions exist in "pockets" of the 
economy or are due to "special" causes-such as 
under-developed or depressed areas, lack of educa-
tion or skills, bad health, lack of personal discipline, 
and discrimination based on age or sex or color. 
These factors are present and require attention, 
but they explain only a fraction of the widespread 
poverty and deprivation today. For while many peo-
ple are poor because they are uneducated or in bad 
health or low morale, the cause and effect is just as 
frequently in the reverse order. Similarly, people 
may be without jobs because they are unskilled, or 
vice versa. 
To be sure, the weaker claimants are likely to be 
the first to be skipped when there is not enough to 
go around, but the main difficulty lies in the short-
age of total economic opportunity. Periods of high 
economic growth and reasonably full utilization of 
productive resources have generated the most rapid 
reduction of poverty and deprivation. Any workable 
program for economic growth in the future must 
include the very programs and policies which would 
remedy the "special" causes of poverty and depriva-
tion. 
20% OF U.S. Is AN UNDEVELOPED MARKET 
These 38 million Americans living in poverty are 
virtually no market for either soft or durable con-
sumer goods. Their purchasing power is restricted 
to the barest requirements for sustenance. The mar-
keting implication is that about 20% of the Amer-
ican domestic market remains to be developed by 
improving the productiveness of 38 million Amer-
icans, and thereby boosting their purchasing power. 
DIVERSION OF MILITARY SPENDING 
WOULD SPUR SOLUTION 
The alternative budget allocations to domestic 
efforts (Part 7) and to international efforts (Part 9) 
would make it possible to advance the solution of 
these problems. Let us examine a few possibilities: 
1. The stimulating effects of a tax cut would tend 
to be concentrated in consumer and capital spend-
ing for goods and services. Many of the industries 
involved would thereupon be able to operate at 
higher levels, thus reducing unemployment, and 
with it poverty, in the depressed industrial areas. 
2. Increased spending on education would make 
it possible, along with other steps, to correct the 
lack of training which is a handicap of the poor. 
3. A vigorous effort to solve the problems of pub-
lic health would certainly direct itself to the mental 
and physical health of the lowest income groups. 
The Michigan Employment Security Commission 
concluded on the basis of a study of the "unemploy-
abIes" in Michigan that many were highly demoral-
ized and alienated from their surroundings. Indi-
vidual counseling was often necessary. A real job 
of reconstructing our "damaged" human resources 
is feasible in the context of improving our national 
health. 
4. Urban renewal would mean rehabilitating slums 
and blighted areas which generally are inhabited by 
the poorest people. Jobs, often of low skill, could 
be found on the spot in projects of this kind. In-
deed, urban renewal can help provide new jobs for 
many displaced by today's automating industry. 
5. Agricultural rehabilitation would return a sub-
stantial number of the rural unemployed to produc-
tive work. 
6. An imaginative program of world industrial-
ization, sponsored by the U. S., would reinvigorate 
our machine industry and thus give new economic 
life to many depressed areas, for example in the 
Northeast, the Midwest, and New England. At the 
same time, the use of our food-producing capacity 
toward this goal would greatly stimulate farming 
and reduce substantially the problems of rural pov-
erty. 
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9. U. S. FOREIGN AID CAN BE MORE PRODUCTIVE 
by SEYMOUR MELMAN* 
"A lot of the criticism of foreign aid is because the 
critic thought the objective was to get economic 
growth, and this wasn't the objective at all. . . . 
The objective may have been to buy a lease, or to 
get a favorable vote in the UN or to keep a nation f~o?I falling ap~t, or to keep' some country from 
glvmg the Russians airbase rights, or anyone of 
many other reasons." 
-~r. D. A. Fitzgerald, former deputy 
dIrector of the U. S. International Co-
operation Administration; US News 
& World Report, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 48. 
Since the end of World War II Americans have 
supported government programs designed to assist 
European recovery from the war and to spur eco-
nomic development in many parts of the world. 
These mutual security programs have been justified 
on the grounds of strengthening free societies, off-
setting communist expansion, or as humane, con-
structive acts of a rich society on behalf of the im-
poverished. . 
The transfer of U. S. military spending to civilian 
purpose as suggested in Part 2 of this series would 
permit substantial increases in foreign aid pro-
grams. However, this would be no license for either 
unlimited or wasteful efforts. 
The proposals given in this paper suggest possible 
ways for accelerating the process for economic de-
velopment in the rest of the world under such condi-
tions a~d. at such a rate as to enhance the personal 
and polItIcal freedom of the peoples of Asia, Africa, 
and .Latin America. Emphasis is given in these sug-
gestIons to measures which improve local com-
petence for a development "takeoff" that is locally 
powered. 
AID PROGRAMS COULD CREATE HUMAN CAPITAL 
High rates of illiteracy and a lack of trained peo-
ple are major factors that hold back the processes 
of economic development. We in the U. S. are in a 
unique position to invest some "seed money" in the 
form of relatively low-cost systems that would make 
po~si?le . very rap~d development of literacy and 
traInIng In the baSIC mechanical arts. 
Television transmission systems with transistor-
ized receivers, powered by solar (or hand-generator 
charged) batteries, can reach into the most remote 
village at about $150 per set or less. Television is a 
dramatically inexpensive device as compared to the 
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cost of training teachers (and training teachers to 
teach teachers). Breaking the literacy barrier in 
many countries means also breaking the barrier for 
accelerating economic development on a self-pow-
ered basis. Grant money ought to be concentrated 
on high-payoff operations of this sort. 
MEANS FOR IMPROVING FOOD SUPPLY 
AND LAND TENURE 
In January, 1962, Morris Forgash1, presented "A 
Plan for an International Bank for Economic Ac-
celeration of Backward Countries" to the Atlantic 
Convention of NATO Nations meeting in Paris. The 
essenti~l idea here is the use of a major banking 
ope~atIon relying primarily on private financing as 
an Instrument for accelerating land reform and 
thereby economic development in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America. 
The plan for this bank .was presented on the 
basis of an impressive analysis of agricultural pro-
ductivity and land tenure systems, and the role that 
land reform can playas a catalyst in economic 
development. 
One of the major difficulties in carrying out for-
eign land-redistribution measures-in Latin Amer-
ica, for example-resides in the unwillingness of the 
landowners to accept bonds in exchange for their 
excess land holdings. To give them cash as they 
would like is often impossible, because of the infla-
tion that would result immediately, but payment in 
conventional long-term bonds smacks of outright 
expropriation because of the long experience with 
inflation. 
Acceptance of payments in long-term bonds 
could be eased by attaching a purchasing power 
guarantee to the principal and the interest of the 
bonds-a guarantee that might be underwritten by 
the NATO countries. An institution like the Inter-
national Bank for Economic Acceleration of Back-
ward Countries would actually provide an incentive 
to accelerate serious measures toward land redis-
tribution. 
* I. am ~leased to acknowledge valuable suggestions for this 
discusslOn from Professor Albert O. Hirschman, Department 
of Economics, Columbia University. 
1 M. Forgash, .President, U.S. Freight Corp., 711 Third Avenue 
New York CIty. ' 
MEANS OF STABILIZING COMMODITY PRICES 
During the last decade, prices of raw materials 
sold b~ Latin American and other under-developed 
countrIes have tended to decline relative to the 
prices of industrial goods which these same countries 
purchased abroad. The result has been an important 
decline in the foreign exchange income of countries 
relying on exports of a few primary products. 
Ways of dealing effectively with this problem 
without interfering with the price system have been 
canvassed recentlyl and have resulted in the pro-
posal of an insurance system which, at most, is 
likely to cost the industrial countries $500 millions 
per year. A U. S. share of $250 millions is indicated. 
PROGRAMS SHOULD ENCOURAGE LOCAL 
PARTICIPATION IN INVESTMENT 
Undivided ownership of foreign agricultural, min-
~ng, and manufacturing enterprises by U. S. private 
Interests turns out to be more and more of a liability 
to the U. S. and hamstrings its desire to establish 
friendly relations with the governments and peoples 
of emerging countries. Attempts to bring local do-
mestic capital into joint ventures have not changed 
the picture to any substantial extent. Total direct 
investments by U. S. firms in the less developed areas 
amount to approximately $14 billions. 
It is proposed that the U.S. government announce 
a program of progressive local participation in con-
trol of these properties, making it possible for for-
eign governments or their citizens to take over up 
to one-half of these properties in a period of ten 
years-at an annual cost of $700 millions. This 
would be a once-and-for-all operation. Thereafter, 
U.S. capital would be permitted to go overseas only 
if it does not amount to more than 49% of any ven-
ture on an equity basis. On the other hand, invest-
ment of capital on such a minority basis should re-
ceive powerful tax and other incentives - the cost of 
such incentives to the treasury may well amount to 
$200 millions to $300 millions a year. 
Strong sUPi ort has lately been marshalled for 
federal insurance on U. S. private investments 
abroad. A well-conceived program of U. S. private 
investment that is coupled with scheduled increases 
in local participation and control could very well 
make a program for insuring assets redundant. 
MEANS FOR CONTAINING INFLATION IN 
UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
There has long been a need to supplement exist-
ing project lending as engaged in by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Export-Import 
Bank. Bank capital is needed for general-purpose 
balance-of-payments and iI?-flation-averting loans. 
If projects are successful, this means that they 
will have a multiplier effect on more economic 
activity and investment through income and linkage 
effects. Hence, successful projects will give rise to 
additional balance-of payments and inflation pres-
sures unless these pressures are cushioned by the 
availability of general-purpose funds. Depending on 
the ratio in which such funds would be made avail-
able in relation to the "project" funds (a one-to-one 
ratio would not be unreasonable), a yearly sum of 
$1 billions to $2 billions would be required. 
1 United Nations Report, International Compensation for Fluc-
tuations in Commodity Trade, 1960. 
10. FISCAL STRATEGIES FOR SHIFTING $22 BILLIONS 
TO CIVILIAN ECONOMY 
by WILLIAM VICKREY* 
Managing the shift of $22-billions worth of re-
sources from military to civilian use is no small 
assignment. There seems to be no valid military 
reason why this diversion should not take place with 
all the promptness that can be managed. There are 
strong humanitarian and economic reasons for mak-
ing these resources available for productive and life-
enhancing purposes. The only delay justified is that 
needed to avoid gross inefficiency and excessive 
hardship resulting from unduly severe and sudden 
dislocations. 
* Professor of Economics, Columbia University; recently, con-
sultant to the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization; 
author of many economic studies including "Utility Strategy 
& Social Decision Rules", Quarterly J oumal of Economics, 
November 1960; named Social Scientist of the Year by the 
American Social Scientist, 1961. 
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While the transfer proposed is a relatively small 
one compared to that which took place with notable 
success at the close of World War II, the circum-
stances of the relatively smooth 1945-1946 transi-
tion no longer exist. We do not start from a situa-
tion of intense high employment, backlogs of de-
mands of all kinds, and accumulated savings and 
liquidity in excess of normal to finance the filling of 
those backlog demands. 
Rather we must start from a period of economic 
doldrums in which such unfilled needs as do exist 
are poorly supported with effective purchasing 
power. But we should recall that while the 1945-
1946 transition proved much smoother than many 
anticipated, it was not achieved without consider-
able thought, planning, and effort. The problem of 
engineering an equally smooth transition, even of 
smaller magnitude, at this juncture is going to need 
more than casual good will. 
The key essentials for a program designed to ac-
complish such a transition are adequacy and flexi-
bility. One certainly cannot expect to produce a 
major change in the tempo of a $600-billions econ-
omy with minor tax adjustments of $2- or $3- bil-
lions a year, particularly if they are spread over 
several years in the future, any more than one could 
expect to steer the Queen Mary with a canoe paddle. 
A shift of $22-billions of resources out of the mili-
tary and into other sectors, however, is beginning 
to get out of the paddle class. The way we handle an 
assignment of such a magnitude is going to have 
very substantial effects on the economy. 
Just what these effects are likely to be, however, 
is something for which we have relatively little hard 
experience. We have had almost no experience with 
deliberate transfers of this direction and magnitude 
undertaken from a state of relatively low-pressure 
economic activity. We have a number of fairly 
reasonable theories as to how this should work out 
in a qualitative way, but the success of quantitative 
predictions based on such theories in analogous 
situations has been only moderate. 
PLAN FOR $22-BILLIONS' TRANSITION 
MUST BE FLEXIBLE 
As we proceed, we shall have to keep close watch 
on how measures work out and be prepared to 
modify our actions according to their effectiveness 
and the readiness of responses. It would be fool-
hardy for even an experienced pilot to undertake to 
get the Queen Mary out of the harbor if he is re-
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quired to lash the helm in a fixed position for half 
an hour at a time. For an apprentice to attempt this 
would be almost certain disaster. We are still no 
better than apprentices in the techniques of con-
trolling major shifts in our economy. 
With a $22-billions shift under consideration, it 
would be extremely dangerous to the health of the 
economy to attempt to decide in advance for one or 
two years, or longer, just what the magnitude of the 
net government contribution to aggregate demand is 
to be. Such a commitment would carry grave risks 
of allowing the country to run into difficulties of in-
flation on the one hand or unemployment on the 
other. Accordingly, one should not even attempt to 
layout the precise magnitudes of the measures to be 
taken. One can only indicate alternative directions 
which policy might take in dealing with the prob-
lems and suggest an over-all strategy for selecting 
policies and then modifying them in the light of 
developments at monthly or quarterly intervals. 
POLITICALLY ATTRACTIVE METHODS COULD 
PROVE DANGEROUS 
One can indicate from the outset that some 
methods of handling a $22-billions shift from mili-
tary to civilian activity, while politically attractive, 
are almost sure to produce poor and possibly dis-
asterous results. Looking at the climate in which 
such a shift is likely to be considered, one can think 
of groups eager to make the shift primarily an occa-
sion for the expansion of government welfare, inter-
national aid, research, and other programs. Other 
groups might seize the occasion for tax reduction. 
Still other groups would clamor for reduction of the 
national debt. In the give and take of political com-
promise, a program might emerge, calling for, say, 
an $8-billions increase in government civilian activ-
ities, $7 -billions worth of tax rate reduction, and 
projecting $7 -billions worth of public debt reduc-
tion-each on an annual basis. 
The actual consequences of such a compromise 
might well be other than would be naively expected. 
A reduction of $14 billions in the amount the gov-
ernment would be directly pumping into the income 
stream would be only partially offset by perhaps $6-
billions of increased consumer spending out of the 
$7 -billions of tax reduction. 
In the face of this over-all reduction in final de-
mand for goods, any major investment in new pro-
duction facilities of the funds thus released by liqui-
dation of government bonds, would be unlikely. 
One could expect, as a result of such a policy, an 
immediate increase of at least 1 % in the unem-
ployed. If the tax and expenditure rates thus adopted 
were persisted in, the cumulative effect could well 
be the rise of unemployment to levels representing 
severe depression. The consequent reduction in tax 
revenues would mean a failure to realize the intended 
reduction in the national debt. A transfer of this 
magnitude from military to civilian activity cannot 
be managed satisfactorily on the basis of mere 
political compromise. A basically consistent policy 
must be worked out. 
THERE IS A RANGE OF CHOICES FOR 
ACCOMPLISHING SHIFT 
Such a shift can be managed in a number of ways 
without plunging the economy into a tailspin. It will 
require big thinking commensurate with the size of 
the problem. Even an $8-billions increase in civilian 
government expenditure would mean, in terms of 
the federal government, a doubling of all direct non-
military expenditures for goods and services. 
Conceptually the simplest way of effectuating a 
transfer of resources from military to civilian use 
would be to expand government civilian programs 
at the same pace that military programs are reduced. 
This is possible, but would mean a tremendous ex-
pansion of government civilian activity. If consid-
ered in terms of federal civilian expenditures alone, 
it would mean more than trebling them. If consid-
ered in terms of the combined civilian expenditures 
of all governments-federal, state, and local-it would 
mean an increase of over 30 per cent. An attempt to 
channel such an increase through the various state 
and local agencies, even if largely financed by the 
federal government, would necessarily encounter 
serious delays. 
One of the more attractive ways of applying the 
bulk of the resources released from military use 
would be to increase our civilian assistance to under-
developed countries. Admittedly there are difficul-
ties to be surmounted in doing this. On a technical 
economic level the problem of maintaining a bal-
ance in the flow of international payments is not an 
inconsiderable one (See Part 4) . 
The balance of payments would not represent a 
serious problem if the aid were to take the form of 
distributing materials from accumulated stockpiles. 
Essentially, however, such a release of stockpiled 
materials would have to be in addition to other 
transfers of resources, as such a release of itself 
would not generate any income or purchasing power 
for new products. Thus such aid would not have the 
same employment-creating effect as the purchase of 
goods and services currently being produced. 
ROLE OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 
It is not necessary to rely primarily upon big gov-
ernment to absorb effectively the resources released 
by a massive military spending cutback. Adequate 
stimulation of consumer demand through tax reduc-
tion can also do the job if carried out to the required 
extent. The difficulty is in rethinking the relation-
ships involved so as to accept the budgetary con-
sequences. 
At one extreme the entire $22 billions could be 
picked up by about a 6 per cent increase in per-
sonal consumption expenditures, but to induce per-
sonal consumption expenditures to expand by $22 
billions-say, from a $350-billions level to a $372-
billions level-would probably require tax cuts in the 
neighborhood of $25 to $30 billions. In such a case, 
there would be no reduction in the national debt. 
Rather, there would be an increased deficit. Yet, 
this road is a feasible one, as would be various inter-
mediate programs between these extremes. 
Military resources can be transferred effectively 
to other purposes in a number of different ways. 
This will require imaginative policies of appropriate 
magnitude and free of mutually inconsistent goals. 
One may long for an economy with a low level of 
government expenditure, a balanced budget, a stable 
price level, and full employment, but with today's 
technology and today's demands for individual 
security, simultaneous achievement of all four of 
these objectives simply is not possible. Full employ-
ment with a reduced level of government activity 
cannot be had without either an increased deficit or 
an imminent threat to price stability. Full employ-
.. ment with a balanced budget and stable prices would 
require a greatly increased level of government 
activity. 
There is of course no gold-plated guarantee that 
unforeseen and possibly serious economic problems 
may not arise in attempting a shift of this magni-
tude. The two most obvious threats are of course in-
flation and unemployment. While both of these are 
serious, it would be a mistake to regard them as 
threats of equal seriousness. Inflation is indeed theft, 
but unemployment is vandalism. Inflation indeed 
transfers unjustly a share of the economic pie from 
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TABLE I 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF HOW FIRST-YEAR MILITARY BUDGET REDUCTIONS OF $22 BILLIONS 
COULD BE USED EFFECTIVELY TO CREATE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 
A Range of Private-Public-Responsibility Budgets for Using $22 Billions 
of Reduction in 1964 Military Budget in Terms of Areas of Deficiency in U. S. Economy 
Class of. Activity 
U. S. Domestic 
Additional Private Expenditure* .. ... ... ....... .. . 
Education .. ........... ... ....... ....... .. ...... ..... .. ...... . 
Urban Renewal .. ...... .... ... .. .... .. .... ... ..... ..... .. . . 
Urban Transit ... ....... .... .. ... .... ....... .... ... ... .. ... . 
Public Health ............... .. ....... ....... ......... .. ... .. . 
Capital Investment in Human Resources 
(Poverty and Depressed Areas) ........ .... ... . 
Water, Air, Soil and Other Resources 
Conservation .... ..... .... .............................. . 
Primarily Private 
Productive Initiative 
15.0* 
1.5 
1.6 
0.2 
0.3 
0.5 
0.2 
Mixed Private 
and Government Primarily Government 
Productive Initiative Productive Initiative 
(In Billions of Dollars) 
10.0* 4.0* 
2.0 4.0 
3.0 4.0 
'0.3 0.4 
0.7 1.0 
1.0 1.3 
1.5 2.5 
Subtotals ... ............ .... . ... .... ..... .... .. .... 19.3 18.5 17.2 
World-Wide 
Capital Investment in Human Resources ...... 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Bank for Economic Acceleration .............. .... 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Commodity Prices Support .. ...... ... ......... ... .. . 0.1 0.2 
C . I R .. ** aplta epatnatlon .... .......... .. ..... .......... . 0.2 0.3 
Loans and Grants ........... ..... ...... ........... ......... 0.5 1.0 2.0 
Subtotals ... ... ...... .... ...... .. ....... .... ..... .. 2.7 3.5 4.8 
Totals ....... .... .... . ..... ...... .... ... 22.0 22.0 22.0 
*If these additions to private expenditure are to be induced by a tax cut, the cut will have to be larger than the induced spending; how 
much larger being partly conjectural, to be determined on the basis of experience. 
**See Part 9 above, Section on "Programs should encourage local participation in investment." 
creditors to debtors, but unemployment spills part 
of the pie on the floor. Inflation is still compatible 
with growth both at home and abroad; unemploy-
ment is a waste and a betrayal of our stewardship 
of the lion's share of the world's resources. Big gov-
ernment is of course also something of a threat to 
free institutions; yet the maintenance of a super-
ficial prosperity on the basis of an extravagant and 
even dangerous level of military expenditure is the 
very worst kind of "big government." 
ILLUSTRATIONS FOR FIRST-YEAR USE OF 
$22 BILLION To CREATE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 
The figures shown in Table 1 give three alterna-
tive ways in which resources released by a $22-bil-
lion cut in military expenditures could be applied to 
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productive civilian uses. These are illustrations only, 
and not in any sense recommendations. 
It is to be noted that the figures given in the first 
row are the amounts that will be added to expendi-
tures by the public as a result of the tax cut, and 
not the amount of the tax cut itself. The tax cut may 
have to be from ten to thirty per cent larger than 
this, particularly in the first year, to allow .for that 
part of tax reduction that will fail to get put back 
into effective circulation through increased con-
sumer expenditures or private investment. It is not, 
indeed, to be expected that much net additional 
private investment will result from the additional 
consumer expenditures, since to a considerable ex-
tent, such investment would be taking the place of 
the private investment formerly stimulated by mili-
tary expenditures. It is likely that the tax cut might 
have to be relatively higher in the first year of the 
transition than in subsequent years, in order to 
assure a prompt and reasonably smooth transition. 
In any case, freedom of action should be retained 
to permit an appropriate portion of the tax cut to 
be rescinded whenever it is no longer necessary to 
bolster consumer demand. 
The figures illustrate that at one extreme it is pos-
sible to provide for almost the entire $22-billion re-
duction in military expenditures to be reflected in an 
immediate tax cut, and still leave room for the 
amounts that individuals will decide to save out of 
this tax cut to be borrowed by the government and 
invested in education and other resource-creating 
activities that will increase the productivity of the 
economy in future years, and enhance the heritage 
that we pass on to future generations. At the other 
extreme, it is not at all difficult to develop worth-
while government-sponsored projects that could ab .. 
sorb nearly the whole of the resources thus released. 
There is a wide range of choice. 
11. OUR POLICIES SHAPE THE NEXT GENERATION 
by BENJAMIN SPOCK, M.D.* 
American children, recent studies show, are being 
made increasingly anxious by the cold war. Between 
25 and 50 per cent of our children in U. S. schools 
today expect nuclear attack. The young ones worry 
most about being poisoned by fallout, about being 
separated from their parents in a disaster, about the 
maiming or death of their families and themselves. 
Adolescents speak with some bitterness about the 
uncertainty of their future, about the possibility of 
their giving birth to deformed children, about the 
futility of working hard at school. 
Children have also been infected with an un-
healthy suspiciousness. When a fifth-grade class, for 
example, was looking at a picture of the Russian 
countryside showing a tree-lined road and one child 
asked what the trees were for, others quickly sug-
gested, "So the people won't know what's going on 
beyond the road" and "It's to make work for the 
prisoners. " 
Until very recent times America has been an out-
standingly buoyant nation. We have imbued our chil-
dren with optimism. We have brought them up be-
lieving that they would be able to cope with what-
ever life offered, and so they've usually succeeded. 
We've never restricted their vision with narrow tra-
ditions or cautions, so they have been extraordi-
narily creative. We have given them a natural trust 
in people and a trust in their own ability to deal 
with people. As a result, they've impressed the world 
with their self-assured friendliness. 
Up to a few years ago, America's influence in the 
world was always on the ascendent. Whatever we've 
set our minds to-whether it was expanding our ex-
ports, helping to win wars, developing the atomic 
bomb, rehabilitating Europe with the Marshall plan 
-we've succeeded. But in recent years, we've run 
into repeated conflicts with the Communists and we 
have had to be satisfied with stalemates. In certain 
psychological aspects, we have reacted neurotically 
to these setbacks. Instead of calmly pursuing the 
course which would serve our long-time aims, we 
have often seemed obsessed with the fear of what 
the Communists would do to us. 
To the degree that we adults become fearful and 
suspicious, we pass such attitudes on to our chil-
dren. Specific studies have shown that when chil-
dren are taught to fear others, it is always harmful 
to their personalities. Educated parents no longer 
try to control a youngster with threats of the bogey-
man. If an adolescent boy is convinced that mem-
bers of any group other than his own constitute a 
threat to him-physically, scholastically, socially, or 
economically, his assurance and ability to deal with 
people will be undermined, even though he believes 
he belongs to a stronger group. 
The exaggerated fear of Communist nations that 
will be carried into adulthood by an increasing 
number of today's children will lower their opti-
mism, their self-reliance, and their total effective-
ness. Furthermore, this fear and its consequences 
could be played upon by an unstable leader, just as 
fear in Germany was exploited by Hitler, to push 
* Professor of Child Development, Western Reserve University, 
Medical School; Baby and Child Care, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
Inc. and Pocketbooks Inc. (many editions); Problems of 
Parents, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston, 1962. 
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this country into war. The repercussions of fear of 
outside aggression could be extended disastrously 
into a wholesale mistrust of all one's fellow men, in-
cluding one's neighbors. 
We will continue to undermine our children's 
confidence unless we can substitute positive aims 
for passive fears and suspicions. Children respond 
to a challenge even more readily than we adults. 
The poverty, hunger, disease and injustice that have 
always plagued humanity-today as extreme as ever 
in many parts of the world - are no longer neces-
sary. We in America have the scientific knowledge 
and the enormous industrial power to begin to 
change the face of the earth now, if we should 
choose to do so. Such a course would compel the 
Communist nations to follow our lead. Such a 
course would give our children not only courage 
but a deepening sense of inspiration and dedication. 
For data I am indebted to: 
MELVIN ALLERHAND, Ph.D., Western Reserve University 
SIBYLLE ESCALONA, Ph.D., Albert Einstein Medical School 
MILTON SCHWEBEL, Ph.D., New York University 
B.S. 
NOTES ON MILITARY STRATEGIES 
SEYMOUR MELMAN 
ALAN L. MADIAN 
Conventional Military Assumptions 
1. Addition to offensive capability increases mili-
tary power (or deterrence). 
2. Defensive systems can effectively protect suf-
ficient numbers to insure an on-going society. 
3. With plausible technological break-throughs the 
shores of the United States can be shielded 
against military assault. 
4. With sufficient nuclear delivery capability, the 
military power of the USSR could be destroyed 
and the U. S. spared a counterblow. 
5. A nuclear war would be composed of a series 
of nuclear weapons exchanges. 
6. For military security a lead must be held in all 
relevant research and technology, together with 
a preponderance of military materiel. 
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Strategic Changes Due to Overkill Capability 
1. Addition to offensive capability in the overkill 
range does not add to military power (or deter-
rence): overkill of 1000 is not greater than 
overkill of 100. 
2. All defensive strategies and technologies can 
be saturated, overwhelmed or evaded by vari-
ety and quantity of offensive power. A 99 o/c 
effective defense against overkill of more than 
100 leaves overkill. 
3. See proposition 2. 
4. Hardened missile sites and submarine based 
missiles on both sides renders this strategy in-
operative. 
5. Major portions of military communication net-
works would be destroyed. Under stress of 
combat some military and civilian leaders could 
be expected to react independently, releasing 
the nuclear weapons at their command. (For 
example the Commander of a Polaris Submarine 
has control of 16 missiles carrying the equiva-
lent of 8 megatons of TNT.) 
6. This assumption is nullified by propositions 1 
and 2 (above). 
7. The total strength of our military system is 
maximized by improving the strength of each 
component. 
8. We must be co -:. ~ llt to cope with all military 
contingencies. 
9. The United States must be prepared to absorb 
a nuclear first strike and have sufficient reserve 
power to strike back, punish the aggressor, and 
stop hostilities. 
10. Preeminent military power is the decisive re-
quirement for successful conduct of American 
foreign policy. 
7. Our total military power cannot be defined as 
the sum of the parts. Sub-optimization-making 
a better warhead, a better anti-missile missile, 
a better vehicle-is the prevailing approach of 
the Department of Defense, despite its nullifica-
tion by propositions 1 and 2 (above). 
8. The United States is a wealthy society but not 
an infinitely wealthy society. For example, in-
complete protection from fallout, which could 
cost 50 to 300 billion dollars, can only be 
gained at the expense of generating economic 
weakness which in turn weakens the security 
of the United States. 
9. In 1960, Dr. Jerome Wiesner advised that stu-
dies by the U.S. Army and Navy indicated that 
two hundred secured missiles would be an ade-
quate deterrent. We now posess 940 such mis-
siles. The assumption that we need additional 
weapons to destroy Soviet missiles and allied 
weapons overlooks the relatively small Soviet 
delivery capability (and the relatively invul-
nerable Soviet Polaris-type submarines). The 
Soviets would have to use their entire strength 
in a first blow in order to minimize the power 
of the counter-attack. Our counter-attack on 
military targets would be on empty holes. 
10. When potential opponents each possess more 
than 100 times overkill, neither can be pre-
eminent. Over 600 million Chinese went under 
Communist rule while the West had a nuclear 
monopoly. Industrial-economic power is crucial 
for shaping the social and political systems of 
developing nations. 
PRESENT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE MILITARY ECONOMY 
Present Assumptions 
1. As our economy enlarges its military research 
and production for ourselves and our allies, we 
stimulate our domestic economy and remove the 
drain on our gold reserves. 
2. The recent and recommended scale of military 
spending does not undermine the traditional fea-
tures of the American economic system. 
Present Conditions 
1. Military production is inhibiting investment 
in the civilian economy; military expenditures 
abroad have converted our favorable balance of 
trade into an unfavorable balance of payments, 
which results in a drain on our gold reserve and 
jeopardizes the value of the dollar. Military re-
search and production has preempted two-thirds 
of our engineering and scientific personnel. 
2. The Department of Defense has imposed re-
straints and increasingly detailed regulation upon 
industrial contractors who produce over 20% of 
all manufactures. 
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